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Many states in Latin America, Africa and Asia lack the monopoly of violence, identified by Max Weber
as the foundation of the state, and thus the capacity to govern effectively. In this paper we develop
a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence and the formation of the state.
We build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate non-state armed actors (paramilitaries)
in a democracy. The model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence
elections. Since paramilitaries have preferences over policies, this reduces the incentives of the politicians
they favor to eliminate them. The model also shows that while in non-paramilitary areas policies are
targeted at citizens, in paramilitary controlled areas they are targeted at paramilitaries. We then investigate
the predictions of our model using data from Colombia between 1991 and 2006. We first present regression
and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects
on elections for the legislature and the executive. Next, we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent
with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes
to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in
areas where the Presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well. These results illustrate
that, consistent with our model, there appears to be a symbiotic relationship between some executives
and paramilitaries. Finally, we use roll-call votes to illustrate a possible ‘quid pro quo’ between the
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1 Introduction
Many scholars have argued that di￿erences in state capacity are a key factor in comparative
economic and political development (see for instance Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985,
Evans, 1989, 1995, Kohli, 2004). Although state capacity is multi-faceted, it inevitably relies
on Weber’s famous notion of the state as \a human community that (successfully) claims the
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (1946, p. 78). States
vary greatly in their capacities and whether or not they have such a monopoly of violence, and
there is little evidence that this variation has decreased over the recent past. For example, in the
1990s the state in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Congo and Rwanda, completely collapsed
and gave up any pretence of undertaking the tasks that we associate with states. In Latin America,
Colombia, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua have all recently experienced or are now
experiencing prolonged civil wars, with the writ of the state being absent from large parts of the
country. In Pakistan the central state in Islamabad has little control of the ‘tribal areas’ such as
Waziristan. Similarly, the Iraqi state in Baghdad exercises little authority in Kurdistan.
Why do some states fail to establish this monopoly? The social science literature emphasizes
several key ideas, for instance, the inability of states to establish such monopoly because of
‘di￿cult geography’ (Herbst, 2000), ‘rough terrain’ (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), or simply poverty
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003). It has also suggested that inter-state competition and warfare (Hintze,
1975, Tilly, 1975, 1990, Brewer, 1988, Herbst, 2000, Bates, 2001, Centeno, 2002) and domestic
political competition in￿uence the incentives of politicians to build state capacity (Acemoglu,
Ticchi, Vindigni, 2006, Besley and Persson, 2007). Common to all of these explanations is a type
of ‘modernization’ view, suggesting that as society modernizes and grows richer, state capacity
will simultaneously develop. In particular ‘state formation’ involves eliminating armed actors
and establishing a monopoly of violence, in the same way that after the Wars of the Roses the
victorious Tudors disarmed the English aristocracy (Storey, 1968).
Yet several of the examples above are quite puzzling from this point of view. In the case of
Pakistan, the tribal areas have existed since the formation of the country in 1947, and even though
they have been largely out of the control of the central state, they have also been represented
within it. Under the 1973 Constitution the tribal areas had 8 representatives in the National
Assembly elected by the tribal elders, or the Maliks. Under General Musharraf’s regime this was
increased to 12. In Iraq, while the peshmerga militia control the streets of Mosul, a coalition of
Kurdish political parties keeps the government in power in Baghdad. In Colombia, as we shall
see, as much as one third of the legislature may have been elected in elections heavily in￿uenced
1by armed paramilitary groups. After many of these were arrested by the Supreme Court, the
Colombian President did little to stop their alternates from voting in their absence.
These examples point to a di￿erent path of state formation than the one taken by England
under the Tudors and subsequently enshrined in the social science literature. Instead, they sug-
gest that state formation can take place without a monopoly of violence being established. In this
paper we develop a new perspective on state formation, emphasizing the idea that aspects of state
weakness, particularly the lack of monopoly of violence in peripheral areas, can be an equilibrium
outcome. Moreover, in contrast to the implicit notion common in the previous literature, ‘mod-
ernization’ need not automatically eradicate non-state armed actors. Although we believe that
the ideas proposed in this paper have relevance both in democratic or non-democratic contexts,
we develop a model formalizing these notions in the context of a democratic country. We then
investigate several of implications of this model using data from Colombia.
Our model begins from the observation that in a democracy non-state armed actors (in our
context, paramilitaries) can control citizens’ voting behavior. Since paramilitaries naturally have
preferences over policies, when they choose to become involved in politics, this reduces the incen-
tives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them. The model predicts that in non-paramilitary
areas policies are targeted at citizens while in paramilitary areas they cater to the preferences of
paramilitaries. This implies that in paramilitary areas citizens obtain fewer public goods (and
other policies they value). The model further implies that paramilitaries will tend to persist to
the extent that they deliver votes to politicians they prefer|in the Colombian case, to Presi-
dent ￿ Alvaro Uribe|and that this e￿ect is stronger in areas where these politicians would have
otherwise not done as well. Thus non-state armed actors can persist because they can be in
a symbiotic relationship with speci￿c politicians holding power: paramilitaries deliver votes to
politicians with preferences relatively close to theirs, while politicians they helped elect implicitly
or explicitly support laws and policies that they prefer.
We empirically investigate the implications of our model using the recent Colombian experi-
ence, where two main non-state armed actors, the ‘left-wing’ guerrillas Fuerzas Armadas Revolu-
cionarias de Colombia (FARC|The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ‘right-wing’
paramilitary forces, which in 1997 coalesced into the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC|
United Self-Defense Organization of Colombia), have shaped the recent political landscape. We
￿rst provide evidence that paramilitaries, though interestingly not the FARC, have systematically
in￿uenced electoral outcomes. In particular, after the AUC got involved in politics in 2001, the
presence of paramilitaries in a municipality is correlated with the rise of non-traditional ‘third
parties’ (that is, parties other than the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the Socialists), which are
widely recognized to be often directly or indirectly associated with the paramilitaries (e.g., L￿ opez,
2007, Valencia, 2007). We also ￿nd that paramilitary presence is also associated with a greater
concentration of votes within a municipality in legislative elections and with greater support for
2President ￿ Alvaro Uribe, who has enacted several key policies in line with the preferences of the
paramilitaries, in the presidential elections.
The e￿ect of paramilitaries on the elections is further substantiated by the fact that when a
senator’s list receives a greater proportion of its votes in areas with high paramilitary presence,
the senator is more likely to be subsequently arrested for illegal connections with paramilitaries
and to support the two clauses of the Justice and Peace Law that were highly lenient towards
the paramilitaries.1 Table 1 depicts some of the relevant information. On it we placed the 20
senators whose list got the greatest share of their votes in areas with high paramilitary presence.2
Column 1 shows that 45% of these senators belong to ‘third political parties’. Column 4 shows
that the two senators with the highest vote shares have been arrested and found guilty of links
with paramilitary groups. As of May 2009 another 4 senators are under arrest, while a further
3 are under investigation, all for links with paramilitaries. Column 3 shows that the majority of
those in o￿ce at the time also supported the clauses of the Justice and Peace Law.
The evidence mentioned so far is consistent with the assumptions of our model, that paramil-
itaries were actively involved in in￿uencing elections. The main prediction of our model is that
paramilitaries should persist more where they deliver votes to the executive that they prefer,
particularly in areas where this politician would otherwise not do well. This is because elimi-
nating paramilitaries would implicitly cost valuable votes in the election. We also show that the
correlations in the data are broadly consistent with this prediction.
Finally, we examine the roll-call votes in the Senate on the legislation for changing the Con-
stitution to remove the one-term limit and allow presidential re-election to illustrate a possible
channel for the ‘quid pro quo’ between legislators elected from high paramilitary areas and the
executive. We ￿nd evidence that the greater was the proportion of votes a senator’s list obtained
in high paramilitary areas, the greater was the likelihood of the senator to vote in favor of remov-
ing the term limit. Column 2 of Table 1 shows that of those who voted all but three of our ‘top
20’ senators voted in favor of re-election.3
Our econometric analysis proceeds under the assumption that our measures of the presence of
paramilitaries and guerillas are exogenous. We are therefore cautious about giving causal inter-
pretations to the conditional correlations we uncover. For example, it may be that paramilitaries
1These clauses, supported by President Uribe, reduced the penalties that could be applied to former combatants
and removed the possibility of extraditing them (to the United States). They were deemed to be ‘pro-paramilitary’
by international legal analysts and human rights NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
2Table 1 uses our main measures of paramilitary presence using data on attacks and con￿ict incidents. Appendix
Table A1 reproduces Table 1 using a di￿erent measure of paramilitary presence, with very similar results.
3There is no direct evidence that President Uribe is in some formal ‘coalition’ with paramilitaries, and we do not
argue or believe that he is; in fact, the politicians in our theoretical model are not in such a coalition either. What
matters is that President Uribe’s relatively conservative policies are closer to those preferred by the paramilitaries,
who have strong conservative leanings and thus naturally have an interest in maintaining him in power. Some of
our theoretical and empirical results then exploit the fact that he may take this into account in several of his key
decisions.
3select into areas where people’s preferences are ‘conservative’ and would naturally support the new
‘third parties’ or President Uribe, thus creating a positive association between these variables and
paramilitary presence. Nevertheless, most of our ￿ndings come from panel data models with ￿xed
e￿ects, so that if there are time-invariant di￿erences in political preferences across municipalities,
these will not in￿uence our results. In addition, we use direct controls for how ‘conservative’
di￿erent municipalities are, and as already mentioned above, in the regressions on the persistence
of the paramilitaries over time, we see paramilitaries persist precisely in places which, in the ab-
sence of paramilitary coercion, were relatively unlikely to have voted for President Uribe. Finally,
the fact that paramilitary presence predicts the arrests of senators suggests that politicians are
not simply the perfect agents of underlying voter preferences, but are in fact implicated with the
non-state armed actors, as the case study literature also suggests.
Our empirical evidence comes from a speci￿c country, Colombia; we must thus exercise caution
in making claims about external validity.4 Nonetheless, we believe the political mechanisms
emphasized in this paper are useful in building a richer political explanation for why many modern
(and in fact democratic) states do not establish a monopoly of violence in their territory.5 At the
very least, the theoretical ideas and the empirical evidence presented here show that the implicit
notion that ‘modernization’ in less-developed economies will naturally lead to the formation of
a Weberian state, mimicking the European experience, needs to be revised, re￿ned or perhaps
even abandoned. Colombia has experienced over a century of sustained increases in GDP per-
capita, large increases in educational attainment, rapid urbanization, indeed all of the features of
modernization (Robinson and Urrutia ed., 2007). Yet the state has not established a monopoly
of violence.
In addition to the literature cited above, the arguments in this paper are related to the recent
political economy literature on the determinants of state capacity. For example, Acemoglu (2005)
conceptualizes state capacity as the ability to tax citizens, and examines the consequences of
state capacity for economic growth and welfare. Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2006) model the
endogenous creation of capacity by an elite facing democratization. They argue that the elite may
have an incentive to choose ine￿cient state institutions to limit the amount of redistribution they
4It can also be argued that the political equilibrium of the last decade in Colombia will ultimately pave the way
to a modern Weberian state. Whether this is the case or not has no direct bearing on our analysis. Nevertheless,
we suspect that the symbiotic relationship between the executive and non-state armed groups is not a transient
phenomenon. Chaves, Fergusson and Robinson (2009) show that the outcome of the 1922 Presidential election
was determined by fraud and violence with regional patterns strikingly similar to those seen in 2002 or 2006. In
this light, the mechanisms we isolate here may be the most recent incarnation of a process whose roots lie deep
in Colombian history. In this interpretation, it may have been the prior absence of state presence and authority
that led to the formation of the AUC in the ￿rst place, but in doing so it may have reproduced the same historical
pattern of behavior.
5Naturally, it is possible that the mechanism that we identify here may be less important in non-democratic
regimes, though even dictators require support. Recall, for example, that as noted above it was General Musharraf,
not any of the democratic Pakistani governments, who increased the number of representatives of the tribal areas
in the National Assembly.
4will face under democracy. In a related paper, Besley and Persson (2009) develop a model where
politicians have to decide whether to build ￿scal capacity. None of these papers are concerned
with the issue of establishing a monopoly of violence, which is the focus of our paper.
Within political science our work relates to the literature on ‘subnational authoritarianism’
which has emphasized how democratization at the national level can coexist with highly author-
itarian local practices (O’Donnell, 1993, Gibson, 2005, Mickey, 2009). This research has given
examples of some of the mechanisms contained in our model, but has not developed these ideas
formally, has not noticed the key predictions that our model develops, or provided an econometric
investigation of these ideas.
The literature on civil war addresses some of the issues we emphasize here implicitly, for
example, in its stress on the weakness of the state (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Nevertheless,
most of the research on civil war focuses on the motivations which lie behind the decisions of
people to take up arms against their governments (see, e.g., the excellent survey by Blattman,
and Miguel, 2008). In this work the fact that a state does not have a monopoly of violence arises
because given the expected bene￿t of allocating resources to ￿ghting rebels or insurgents, it is not
worth paying the cost of eliminating them.6
Our work owes a great debt to the journalists, scholars and public o￿cials who have played key
roles in bringing to light the involvement of paramilitaries and the AUC in politics in Colombia.
Particularly important has been the work of the researchers whose essays appear in Romero
(2007). S￿ anchez and Palau (2006) also show that political competition is negatively correlated
with murders of politicians in municipal elections.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop a theoretical model to examine
the incentives of politicians controlling the central state to eliminate or live with non-state armed
actors depending on whether they receive electoral support from these groups. Section 3 provides
a brief overview of the history and nature of non-state armed actors in Colombia. Section 4
describes the data we use and provides some basic descriptive statistics. Section 5 provides
regression evidence consistent with the e￿ects of paramilitaries on electoral outcomes. Section 6
examines the key prediction of our theoretical model, that paramilitaries should persist more in
areas where they deliver votes to the executive and where they would not have otherwise done
as well. Section 7 provides some suggestive evidence on another implication of our model, the
symbiotic relationship between the executive and the paramilitaries. Section 8 concludes.
6There is also a large literature about the origins of con￿ict in Colombia (see Bergquist, Pe~ naranda, S￿ anchez
eds. 1992, 2001, Deas, 1999, and Posada Carb￿ o, 2003). In￿uenced by the wider academic literature on civil wars,
this work has emphasized the importance of state weakness in the Colombian context as well (e.g., Waldmann,
2007). We do not deny that this is important, for example with respect to the persistence of the FARC. Instead,
we emphasize that state weakness in Colombia is not simply about inability to eliminate non-state armed actors;
it is also about the lack of incentives to do so.
52 Model
In this section, we present a simple model to formalize the possible channels of interaction be-
tween central government and paramilitaries.7 Motivated by the Colombian experience, our focus
will be on democratic politics, where an incumbent is facing reelection and decides whether to
reconquer some of the areas under paramilitary control. The model will highlight how paramili-
tary preferences in￿uence electoral outcomes because paramilitaries can coerce voters to support
one candidate over another. It will then show how the e￿ect of paramilitaries on electoral out-
comes in￿uences the willingness of the democratic central government to reconquer and remove
the paramilitaries from di￿erent areas|the conditions of the formation of the modern Weberian
state with a monopoly of violence over the entire country. Finally, we also investigate how the
presence of paramilitaries a￿ects the policy choices of the party in power. Our purpose is to
communicate the main ideas in the simplest possible way. Our empirical work will then provide
evidence showing how paramilitaries in￿uence electoral outcomes and how this e￿ect on elections
interacts with the persistence of paramilitaries in certain areas.
We consider a two-period model of political competition between two parties. Party A is
initially (at t = 0) in power and at t = 1, it competes in an election against party B. The country
consists of a large equal-sized number, N, of regions, with each region inhabited by a large number
of individuals. We denote the collection of these regions by N. The party that wins the majority
of the votes over all regions wins the election at t = 1.8 Regions di￿er in terms of their policy and
ideological preferences and, in addition, some regions are under paramilitary control. We assume
as in standard Downsian models that parties can make commitments to their policies, but their
ideological stance is ￿xed (and may capture dimensions of policies to which they cannot make
commitments).
2.1 Electoral Competition without Paramilitaries
We ￿rst introduce the details of electoral competition at date t = 1 and then return to the
decisions at t = 0, in particular, to those concerning whether the government in power will
expend the resources to reconquer some of the territories under paramilitary control. To start
with, let us ignore the regions that are under paramilitary control (these will be introduced below).
The utility of individual i in region j 2 N (i.e. j = 1;:::;N) when party g 2 fA;Bg is in
7In the empirical work we examine the impact of both the paramilitaries and the FARC on elections. However,
since we do not ￿nd robust e￿ects of the FARC and since case study evidence suggests that the FARC was much
less involved in electoral politics, in the theoretical model we focus on the relationship between politicians and the
paramilitaries. We return to this issue in subsection 2.5.
8This implies that we are looking at a \presidential system," though the empirical evidence below comes mostly
from votes for senators and congressmen. Focusing on the presidential system simpli￿es the argument without any
major implications for our focus.
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where q 2 Q ￿ RK is a vector of policies, uj denotes the utility of all individuals in region j
over this policy vector, ~ ￿j is the ideological bliss point of the individuals in region j 2 N, so
that Y
￿
~ ￿j ￿ ~ ￿g
￿
is a penalty term for the ideological distance of the party in power and the
individual (i.e., Y is a function that’s increasing in
￿
￿ ￿~ ￿j ￿ ~ ￿g
￿
￿ ￿). This ideological distance captures
policy choices not included in q (and to which the party cannot make a commitment at the
election stage). We also assume that each uj is strictly concave and di￿erentiable. Finally, ~ "
g
ij is
an individual-speci￿c utility term that will play the role of smoothing regional preferences over
the two parties as in standard probabilistic voting models (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). We
assume that
~ "A
ij ￿ ~ "B
ij = ￿ + "ij;
where ￿ is a common \valance" term determining the relative popularity of one party versus
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where qA and qB are the policy vectors of the two parties, and
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is the ideological advantage of party A relative to party B in region j 2 N. Now using the fact
that ￿ is also uniformly distributed, the probability that party A gets elected as a function of its






































where RB is party B’s rent from holding o￿ce and we have used the fact that the probability
of party B coming to power is the complement of that for party A. An electoral equilibrium
7at time t = 1 is a tuple
￿
qA;qB￿
that solves problems (1) and (2) simultaneously (given the
ideological biases ￿). Given the concavity and di￿erentiability assumptions, an equilibrium is













where ruj denotes the gradient of function uj with respect to the vector q. Clearly, (3) may not
be satis￿ed if the solution is not in the feasible set of policies, Q, and in this case, an obvious
complementary slackness generalization of (3) holds. Strict concavity of each uj immediately
implies that qA = qB = q￿. It is also straightforward to see that strict concavity implies qA =
qB = q￿ for some q￿, even if the equilibrium is not interior. Therefore, party A will win the
election at time t = 1 with probability












where E￿j denotes the expectation or the mean of ￿j across all regions. This then leads to the
following proposition, characterizing the equilibrium (proof in the text).
Proposition 1 Without paramilitaries, there exists a unique electoral equilibrium (at t = 1)
where qA = qB = q￿, and q￿, if interior, satis￿es (3). Party A wins the election with probability
given by (4).
Two important points to note are as follows. First, without paramilitary presence, national
policies are chosen to cater to the preferences of all voters in all regions. This feature is fairly
general, though as is well known the fact that both parties choose the same policy vector (policy
convergence) is special and relies on the fact that the two parties do not themselves have prefer-
ences over policies. Whether they do or not is not important for the results here, and we therefore
opted for the simpler speci￿cation. Second, average ideological bias across all regions determines
the probability of reelection for party A (which is currently in power). We will next see how this
result changes under various di￿erent assumptions about paramilitary behavior.
2.2 Elections under Paramilitaries with Exogenous Preferences
Next, let us suppose that a subset of the regions, denoted by Z ￿ N are under paramilitary
control. Denote the total number of these regions by Z and their fraction (their ratio to the
number of total regions) by z. The key feature of paramilitary-controlled areas for our purposes
is that, as we will document in detail below, voting is not free but in￿uenced by the implicit or
explicit pressure of the paramilitaries. Throughout the rest of this section we impose this feature.
8We start with paramilitaries with \exogenous preferences," meaning that how the paramili-
taries in￿uence the voting behavior of the citizens in the regions they control is exogenous. This
will contrast with the case in which the support of the paramilitaries is endogenous to the policy
choices, studied in the next subsection. In particular, we take the behavior of the paramilitaries
(and the voting behavior of the citizens in paramilitary-controlled areas) as given. In partic-
ular, suppose that in each paramilitary-controlled region j 2 Z, a fraction ~ mj of the voters
will vote for party A regardless of policies (so the voting behavior of these individuals in these
paramilitary-controlled regions is insensitive to policies). Let us denote the complement of the
set Z by J = NnZ and the total number of regions in this (non-paramilitary-controlled) set by
J = N ￿ Z. Let us also de￿ne mj ￿ ~ mj ￿ 1=2. Then with an identical reasoning to that in the



























where m denotes the vector of mj’s (together with information on which j’s are in the set Z).
We again assume that both parties maximize the probability of coming to power and de￿ne
an electoral equilibrium in the same way. With an identical argument to that before, we obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under paramilitaries with endogenous preferences, there exists a unique electoral
equilibrium (at t = 1) where qA = qB = q￿. If q￿ is interior, it satis￿es
P
j2J ruj (q￿) = 0. Party
A wins the election with probability
PA (q￿;q￿ j ￿;m) =
1
2
+ ￿(1 ￿ z)E[￿j j j 2 J] + zE[mj j j 2 Z]:
Two features that are noteworthy relative to Proposition 1 are as follows. First, policies no
longer cater to the preferences of all regions. Since citizens in paramilitary-controlled areas cannot
reward or punish a government according to the policy proposals that it makes, both parties only
target their policies to the voters in the non-paramilitary-controlled areas. This implies that,
endogenously, public goods and other amenities will be reduced in the paramilitary-controlled
areas beyond the direct e￿ect of paramilitary presence.9 Thus, all else equal, we may expect
paramilitary presence to increase inequality across regions. Second, electoral outcomes will now
be dependent on the in￿uence of the paramilitaries on voting behavior, which is captured by the
last term in PA (q￿;q￿ j ￿;m). If paramilitaries prefer party A, meaning that E[mj j j 2 Z] > 0,
then the probability that party A will win the election (and stay in power) is greater, other things
equal. The more areas are controlled by the paramilitaries, the stronger is this e￿ect. In the
9The direct e￿ect may, for example, stem from the fact that such investments and public good delivery become
more expensive, or paramilitaries directly damage infrastructure, law and order and the availability of public goods.
9empirical work below, we will provide indirect evidence consistent with Proposition 2 by showing
the in￿uence of paramilitaries on electoral outcomes.
This last feature already highlights how paramilitaries can have a major in￿uence on demo-
cratic politics. Nevertheless, this e￿ect was minimized by the model in this subsection by assuming
exogenous preferences for the paramilitaries. We will relax this assumption below. But ￿rst we
discuss how the electoral role of paramilitaries a￿ects the decision of the central government to
extend (\broadcast") its power to peripheral areas controlled by the paramilitaries.
2.3 The State and the Paramilitaries
Taking the electoral equilibrium at time t = 1 as given, let us now consider the decisions of
the government (party A) at time t = 0. In particular, as discussed in the Introduction, a key
dimension of the process of the formation of the state is the ability and willingness of the central
government to establish its monopoly of violence and thus remove the power of other groups with
access to guns and means of exercising (local) violence. Let us model this in the simplest possible
way and suppose that at time t = 0, the objective of the governing party is
X
j2R




where R ￿ Z is a subset of the areas previously controlled by the paramilitary that are \recon-
quered" by the central government, and ￿j is the net bene￿t of reconquering area j 2 R, which
accrues to the government at time t = 0.10 This net bene￿t includes the additional tax revenues or
security gains that the central government will drive and subtracts the potential \real" cost of the
reconquest (spending on the military, potentially stability and loss of life). However, the objective
of the governing party, party A, also includes the probability that it will remain in power, thus
enjoying rents from power at time t = 1. In particular, if some area j 2 Z is reconquered, then in
the subsequent electoral equilibrium at time t = 1, party A will obtain a fraction 1=2+￿￿j of the
votes from this region as opposed to receiving ~ mj = mj +1=2 of the votes had this place remained
under paramilitary control. A subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is de￿ned as an electoral
equilibrium at date t = 1 together with decisions by party A at date t = 0 that maximizes its
utility taking the date t = 1 equilibrium as given.
This analysis in the preceding paragraph then establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A subgame perfect equilibrium involves the electoral equilibrium characterized in
Proposition 2 at time t = 1, and at time t = 0, Party A reconquers
all j 2 Z such that ￿j + (￿￿j ￿ mj)RA > 0
10One could easily extend this so that these rents accrue both at t = 0 and t = 1, and in that case, the objective
functions will change to
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, slightly complicating the analysis.
10and does not reconquer
any j 2 Z such that ￿j + (￿￿j ￿ mj)RA < 0:
This proposition is an important result of our analysis and will be investigated in our empirical
work. It implies that the willingness of the state to reconquer areas controlled by the paramili-
taries, and thus establish the monopoly of violence envisaged as an essential characteristic of the
modern state by Max Weber, is a￿ected not only by the real costs and bene￿ts of doing so, but
also by the implications of this expansion of the authority of the state on electoral outcomes. In
particular, if many of these paramilitary-controlled areas have mj > ￿￿j, then the state, currently
controlled by party A, will be reluctant to reconquer these areas, because doing so will make it
more di￿cult for this party to succeed in the upcoming elections (and moreover, this e￿ect will
be stronger when rents from power at t = 1, RA, are higher). Naturally, the areas that are most
valuable in the hands of the paramilitaries are those that have both low ￿j and high mj; that
is, areas that would have otherwise voted for party B, but paramilitaries are forcing citizens to
vote in favor of party A. A government that does not require electoral support (e.g., a \purely
non-democratic" government) would have decided to reconquer all areas with ￿j > 0. Therefore,
to the extent that ￿E[￿j j j 2 J] < E[mj j j 2 Z], i.e., to the extent that paramilitaries are ide-
ologically closer to the government in power than the opposition party, a democratic government
may be less willing to broadcast its power and reconquer areas under paramilitary control than
such a non-democratic government (or a government that is secure in its position).11
Note an important implication of the functional form assumptions we have imposed so far,
in particular the uniform distributions of idiosyncratic preference and valance terms: the value
of additional votes to the party in power is constant and independent of its \expected winning
probability". As a consequence, Proposition 3 takes a simple form, where the value of paramilitary
votes to the party in power is independent of this probability. With other functional forms, as
in reality, this value, and thus the behavior of this party towards the paramilitary groups, may
depend on its expected winning probability, for example, making it less responsive to the votes
delivered by these paramilitary forces when it is ex ante more likely to win the election.12
2.4 Electoral Competition under Paramilitaries with Endogenous Preferences
The discussion so far was for paramilitaries with endogenous preferences and thus took the vec-
tor m as given. Naturally, the willingness of the paramilitaries to coerce citizens to vote for
11Naturally, the net bene￿t of reconquering an area might be di￿erent for a non-democratic government. For
example, it might be ^ ￿j > ￿j instead of ￿j, because a non-democratic government can impose higher taxes on
certain regions than democratic governments could or would. This would be another incentive for non-democratic
governments to broadcast their power. On the other hand, the cost of doing so may also be higher for non-democratic
governments because they may be unwilling to build a strong army because of the future potential threats that this
may pose to their reign (e.g., Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010). This would then imply ^ ￿j < ￿j.
12As we discuss in the next section, this feature of a more general model may actually be helpful in understanding
some of the recent experiences in Colombia.
11one candidate or another is also endogenous and depends on their policy and ideological prefer-
ences. We now investigate these issues. Suppose that, as with the citizens, the preferences of the
paramilitaries controlling region j 2 Z are given by
Wj (q;￿g) = wj (q) ￿ ^ Y
￿





where ^ Y is another function (possibly the same as Y ) that is also increasing in
￿ ￿
￿~ ￿j ￿ ~ ￿g
￿ ￿
￿ and
now ~ ￿j is the policy preference of the group of paramilitaries controlling region j. With a similar
reasoning to that above, let us de￿ne
^ ￿j ￿ ^ Y
￿




~ ￿j ￿ ~ ￿A
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as the ideological leanings of the paramilitaries in region j in favor of party A (we use ^ ￿j instead
of ￿j to highlight that this refers to the paramilitaries). And in addition, suppose that ~ "A
j ￿~ "B
j has






. Then the probability that paramilitaries in region j 2 Z














Let us also assume that paramilitaries can force all voters in their sphere of in￿uence to vote for
whichever party they prefer. Then the probability that party A will win the election becomes
PA
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where now ^ ￿ denotes the vector of all ideological preferences, including those of the paramilitaries.
Naturally, the model with paramilitaries with exogenous preferences in the previous two sections
is a special case of this model where wj (q) ￿ 0 for all q 2 Q, so that paramilitaries do not care
about policy (though they may still care about the ideological stance of the party in power).
With a similar reasoning to our analysis above, electoral competition will lead to the same
policy choice for both parties, and when it is interior, this vector will be given by the solution to
the following set of equations:
￿(1 ￿ z)ruj (^ q￿) + ^ ￿zrwj (^ q￿) = 0: (6)
Naturally, these equations hold in the complementary-slackness form when ^ q￿ may be at the
boundary of the feasible policy set Q.
Therefore, we obtain the following characterization of electoral equilibrium and e￿orts by the
state to reconquer paramilitary-controlled areas under the control of the paramilitaries (proof in
the text).
12Proposition 4 Under paramilitaries with endogenous preferences, there exists a unique electoral
equilibrium at t = 1 where qA = qB = q￿. If q￿ is interior, it satis￿es (6). Party A wins the
election with probability
PA (q￿;q￿ j ￿;m) =
1
2
+ ￿(1 ￿ z)E[￿j j j 2 J] + z^ ￿E
h
^ ￿j j j 2 Z
i
:
Moreover, the subgame perfect equilibrium involves Party A reconquering (at time t = 0)
all j 2 Z such that ￿j +
￿




any j 2 Z such that ￿j +
￿
￿￿j ￿ ^ ￿^ ￿j
￿
RA < 0:
There are several new features in this proposition. First, when paramilitaries adjust their
support depending on the policies and ideological stance of the two parties, the parties then
change their policies in order to be more attractive to the paramilitaries’ policy preferences.
That is, rather than catering to the preferences of the citizens in the areas that are controlled
by the paramilitaries (which they would have done without the paramilitaries), parties appease
the paramilitaries themselves. This result is the basis of the potential symbiotic relationship
between paramilitaries and the executive mentioned in the Introduction. Moreover, it can further
increase the inequality among the regions, with the policies chosen speci￿cally to support, or
refrain from threatening, the paramilitaries and the areas where the paramilitaries are strongest.
Two features determine how slanted towards the paramilitaries equilibrium policies are. These
are: the size of the paramilitary-controlled areas (the greater is z, the more in￿uential are the
paramilitaries in shaping equilibrium policy) and the relative responsiveness of the paramilitaries
to policy concessions (the greater is ^ ￿ relative to ￿, the more responsive are policies to paramilitary
preferences relative to citizen preferences). In addition, because electoral competition makes
both parties cater to the wishes of the paramilitaries, at the end the paramilitaries ideological
preferences play a central role in whether they force the population to vote for party A or party
B.13
Finally, we can also allow both parties or one of the parties to modify its ideological stance
(in a credible fashion). The same analysis as here will then imply that in order to attract votes
from paramilitary-controlled areas, one or both parties may decide to pander to the ideological
preferences of the paramilitaries.
13The result that both parties modify their policies to partly cater to the wishes of the paramilitaries has an
obvious similarity, and an identical mathematical logic, to Baron’s (1994) result concerning the e￿ects of a lobby
on the platforms of two competing parties.
132.5 Importance of Non-National Ambitions
An important question in the context of Colombian politics is why right-wing paramilitary groups
have become more involved in in￿uencing elections than left-wing guerrillas, in particular, more so
than the relatively well-organized FARC. One possible answer is that in contrast to the guerrillas,
the paramilitaries do not have national ambitions, making a coalition between them and the
executive controlling the central state more feasible. The model presented so far has implicitly
made this assumption, since we did not introduce the risk that the non-state armed actors may
take over the central state.
A simple way of introducing this possibility would be to have a probability ￿(z) that the non-
state armed actors would become strong enough to challenge the central state, perhaps overthrow
it. Such an overthrow of the central government by non-state armed actors is not uncommon in
weak African states, such as Somalia, Sierra Leone or Liberia, and has certainly been the objective
of the FARC. Naturally, we would expect ￿(z) to be increasing in z, so that when these groups
control more areas, they are more likely to pose such a national challenge. In that case, we would
need to change the objective function of party A to incorporate this possibility. For example,
equation (5) could be modi￿ed to
X
j2R




This speci￿cation makes it clear that when ￿(z) > 0, there will be stronger incentives for party
A to reconquer territories controlled by these non-state armed groups (thus reducing z). When
￿(z) is su￿ciently high and su￿ciently decreasing in z, this e￿ect can more than compensate for
the electoral advantage that local control by these groups creates for the party in power. Thus
factoring in the national ambitions of non-state armed actors reduces the room for a coalition
or a symbiotic relationship between these groups and the executive. Expressed di￿erently, this
reasoning suggests that when non-state armed actors have national ambitions, it will be advanta-
geous for the central state to eliminate them (sooner or later), thus any implicit or explicit policy
promises that it makes to such groups would be non-credible, making a coalition between them
impossible. This perspective suggests a natural reason for why, in Colombia, such a coalition may
have been much more likely to arise between the executive and the paramilitaries rather than
with the FARC.
2.6 Summary and Empirical Predictions
In the rest of the paper, we will investigate the e￿ect of Colombian paramilitary forces on the
electoral outcomes in the early 2000s. Our investigation is motivated by the theoretical ideas
discussed above. In particular, we will document the following broad patterns, which, though not
conclusive proof of the ideas developed here, are highly suggestive.
141. Consistent with Proposition 2, paramilitaries, once they became su￿ciently powerful, started
in￿uencing electoral outcomes in the areas of Colombia they controlled.
2. Consistent with Proposition 3, we will show that paramilitaries located in areas that voted
for the current President in great numbers, but in past elections tended to vote for more
liberal politicians, are more likely to persist.
3. Consistent with Proposition 4, we will show that the President has proposed legislation in
line with the preferences of the paramilitaries, and the Senators elected from high paramil-
itary areas have supported this legislation.
3 A Brief Overview of Non-State Armed Actors in Colombia
3.1 Origins of Colombian Non-State Armed Actors
Colombia has a long history of non-state armed actors. During the 19th century the country was
convulsed by a series of civil wars which culminated in the War of Thousand Days between 1899
and 1902 (see Pardo, 2004, for an overview). Relative peace emerged subsequently (Mazzuca
and Robinson, 2009) and lasted until the 1940s when the country again slipped into a murderous
civil war known as La Violencia, which slowly came to a halt after 1958 when the Liberal and
Conservative parties signed a peace treaty and re-established elections, albeit under a highly
restrictive set of power sharing institutions known as the National Front (see Guzm￿ an Campos,
Fals Borda and Uma~ na Luna, 1962, Oquist, 1980, P￿ ecaut, 2001, Rold￿ an, 2002 on La Violencia
and Hartlyn, 1988, on the National Front). Though the National Front brought to an end the 100
year con￿ict between the Liberal and Conservative parties, it issued in multifarious new forms
of con￿ict. In 1964 out of the ashes of various Liberal and Communist guerillas, was formed
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC|The Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia). In the same year the Ej￿ ercito de Liberaci￿ on Nacional (ELN|National Liberation
Army) was also created. These ‘left-wing’ guerilla groups were relatively small during the 1960s
and 1970s, but began to expand rapidly in the 1980s and they were joined by other left-wing
revolutionary movements such as the Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19|Movement of April 19)
and Quint￿ ￿n Lame. The 1980s also saw the rapid expansion of ‘right-wing’ paramilitary forces
which in 1997 coalesced into the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC|United Self-Defense
Organization of Colombia).
These various non-state armed groups ranged over most of the territory of Colombia and
though estimates vary, may have had around 50,000 men and women under arms at the start
of the 21st Century. They engaged in kidnapping, massacres of civilians, drug production and
exportation, and regularly expropriated land and extorted income (‘collected the taxes’) from
Colombian citizens. They also engaged in violent con￿icts with each other and with the armed
15forces of the Colombian state. Map 1 in the Appendix shows the distribution of the FARC/ELN
and the AUC across Colombia’s 1,119 municipalities (using the ‘attacks’ data, described below,
over the period 1997-2005). The map uses di￿erent shades of red to indicate municipalities
in di￿erent quintiles of the distribution of guerrilla presence. The darkest red indicates the
20% of places with the most intense guerilla activity. One can see that this covers most of
Colombia. Departments in the eastern planes (‘Los Llanos’), such as Arauca and Casanare, have
high guerilla presence as do municipalities further south in Caquet￿ a, where the negotiations took
place during the Presidency of Andr￿ es Pastrana. However, high guerilla presence can also be
seen in the Northeast, in the department of Norte de Santander, further west in Antioquia and
in the southwest in Cauca. Map 2 in the Appendix examines paramilitary presence using the
same data. One sees high paramilitary presence, measured in the same way as for the guerilla,
in many of the same areas. These include the eastern planes, Norte de Santander and Antioquia.
Paramilitary presence is also high in municipalities in the coastal department of Magdalena and
in C￿ esar, inbetween Magdalena and Norte de Santander. This is natural, since paramilitaries
often formed to ￿ght the left-wing guerrillas.
3.2 Paramilitaries and the AUC
Colombia’s paramilitaries are thought to originate from 1960s counterinsurgency measures and
Law 48 of 1968 which allowed the creation of self-defense militias by private citizens for the
purposes of protecting their properties and lives (see Romero, 2000, 2002, Rangel, 2005, and
Duncan, 2007, for overviews of the history and organization of the paramilitaries). Nevertheless,
the period of La Violencia is littered with various sorts of militias and spontaneous self-defense
groups (see Rold￿ an, 2002, on Antioquia). Small groups of paramilitaries also emerged in places
where there were valuable resources whose exploitation was contested such as in the emerald
mines of Muzo, in the department of Boyac￿ a and the drug plantations on the coast near Santa
Marta, Magdalena and in the nearby department of La Guajira.
The escalation of paramilitaries in the early 1980s is associated with the rise of the large drug
cartels in Medell￿ ￿n and Cali that faced threats of kidnapping and extortion from left-wing groups.
In 1981 Martha Nieves Ochoa, the sister of Jorge Luis Ochoa V￿ azquez, one of the founders of the
Medell￿ ￿n drug cartel (along with his brothers, Pablo Escobar, Carlos Lehder and Jos￿ e Gonzalo
Rodr￿ ￿guez Gacha), was kidnapped by the guerilla group M-19. In retaliation, the cartel formed an
armed paramilitary group called Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS|Death to Kidnappers) whose
aim was to eliminate kidnappers.
As the wealth of the drug cartels grew, many of their members began to buy up land and
ranches in rural areas. Here their interests began to fuse with those of traditional rural elites who
also wished to protect themselves from extortion and kidnappers (see Guti￿ errez San￿ ￿n and Bar￿ on,
2005, for a study of this process in the Puerto Boyac￿ a region). This led to collaboration in the
16formation of paramilitary groups. One area of rapid expansion was the Magdalena Medio at the
eastern periphery of the department of Antioquia which saw the emergence of groups such as Los
Tangueros formed by the Casta~ no brothers (Carlos, Fidel and Vicente). Five of Carlos Casta~ no’s
11 siblings were killed by guerrillas, following the abduction and death of their dairy-farmer father,
Jesus Casta~ no, in 1981. In 1981, FARC snatched the Casta~ no’s father and demanded a $7,500
ransom, which was raised by mortgaging the farm. Though the ransom was paid, the father’s
corpse was found chained to a tree. Los Tangueros was founded to revenge this act.14
In 1992 people who had been victimized by the drug lord Pablo Escobar founded a paramilitary
organization called ‘Los Pepes’ (‘Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar’|those persecuted by Pablo
Escobar). This group, which played an important informal role in the hunt for Escobar and his
death in 1993 (Bowden, 2002) apparently included all of the Casta~ no brothers, even though they
had previously cooperated with the Medell￿ ￿n cartel. In 1994 the brothers formed the ‘Autodefensas
Campesinas de C￿ ordoba y Urab￿ a’ (ACCU|Peasant Self-Defense force of C￿ ordoba and Urab￿ a).
This further expansion was facilitated in the same year by a law promoted by President Samper
to allow the creation of CONVIVIR, a national program of neighborhood watch groups. An
important supported of this program was ￿ Alvaro Uribe, then Governor of Antioquia, whose father
was killed by the FARC.
In April 1997 the AUC was formed by Carlos Casta~ no and it included possibly 90% of the
existing paramilitary forces. The creation of this national organization increased the e￿ectiveness
of the paramilitaries considerably; as a result, the FARC and ELN were thrown out of large areas
of the country, though as our data will show these guerrilla groups are still active in many parts
of Colombia (see Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas, 2004).15
Soon after coming to power in 2002, President Uribe began to negotiate the demobilization of
the paramilitaries, something he had promised during his election campaign. Decree 128 issued by
the President in January 2003 gave de facto amnesty for paramilitaries not under investigation for
human rights violations and this has been applied to the vast number of demobilizations (around
92%). On July 15, 2003 in Santa F￿ e de Ralito in C￿ ordoba the government signed an agreement
with most of the groups of the AUC to disarm by the end of 2005.16
On November 25 2003 around 860 paramilitaries of Medell￿ ￿n’s Cacique Nutibara Bloc led by
‘Don Berna’ (Diego Fernando Murillo) demobilized. This process was further institutionalized by
the passing of the controversial Justice and Peace Law in June 2005 which was signed into law
14There is also evidence suggesting involvement of the army in the training and organization of paramilitary
groups, though in 1989 the Colombian Supreme Court declared that Law 48 was unconstitutional. One month later
President Barco issued Decree 1194 which prohibited the creation, promotion or organization of paramilitary or
self-defense groups and declared such activities illegal.
15The timing of the creation of the AUC was a consequence of the collapse of the Medell￿ ￿n and Cali drug cartels
which had previously exercised a large amount of control over the organizations.
16The text of the agreement is available at the web page of the O￿ce of the High Commissioner for Peace:
www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/acuerdos/index.htm
17by President Uribe in the following month. Article 29 of this law limits sentences to those found
guilty of human rights violations to between 5 and 8 years. Article 30 allows the government to
determine the place of detention, which need not be a prison. In May 2006 the Colombian Con-
stitutional Court altered many aspects of the law on the grounds that they were unconstitutional,
in particular the Court stipulated that demobilizing combatants had to give a full confession of
their activities in order for the law to apply to them. Both the demobilization process and the
Justice and Peace Law have been widely criticized by human rights organization.17
There is a great deal of controversy about whether the paramilitary demobilization is real or
whether it will lead to new armed groups (or simply to the institutionalization/legitimation of
the power of the AUC; on this issue see Pardo, 2007, International Crisis Group, 2007, Porch and
Rasmussen, 2008).
3.3 The Involvement of Paramilitaries in Politics
Soon after the foundation of the AUC in 1997 there appears to have been a strategic decision to
in￿uence electoral politics. This change is traced to a historic meeting in Santa F￿ e de Ralito in
2001 where members of the estado mayor (the governing body) of the AUC along with politicians
and members of Congress signed a secret document calling for the ‘refounding of the country’.
Those who signed this document included prominent paramilitary leaders, such as Jorge 40 (Ro-
drigo Tovar Pupo) and Diego Vecino, and several politicians subsequently arrested for links with
paramilitaries, including Senators William Montes and Miguel de la Espriella (see Table 1). An
explicit aim of the accord was to have the AUC play a more important role in electoral politics.18
17For instance the 2007 report of the International Federation for Human Rights notes: \The paramilitaries who
do fall under the Justice and Peace Act are tried at so-called \free version" hearings and may be sentenced to
no more than eight years of imprisonment, which they may serve in \work farms." They may even impose their
own conditions for \imprisonment," which ￿ies in the face of the most basic principles of justice in view of the
seriousness of the crimes committed." The report also emphasizes \the lack of true willingness on the part of the
government to bring to trial and dismantle the paramilitary groups," and concludes that: \The paramilitaries
are not forced to confess to their crimes, disclose the truth about who supported their structures, or even show
repentance for their crimes. They have not been forced to turn in all of their weapons or hand over their assets
to compensate the victims, while the latter and their representatives have very limited access to hearings and are
hindered from participating in them....What is more, those victims who have attended the \free version" hearings
have not received adequate protection. Already, sixteen of them have been murdered with absolute impunity." See
also Human Rights Watch (2005) and Amnesty International (2005).
On the issue of handing in weapons the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2007) noted at some key
demobilizations in the department of C￿ esar that \approximately 800 persons had passed through that circuit on
the previous day, but only 65 ￿rearms were received. It also noted that from the 200 persons passing through the
circuit at La Mesa on the previous day, roughly 25 ￿rearms were received. None of the weapons surrendered were
modern or in good condition" (p. 8).
18Although the meeting in Ralito was probably the most important one for the subsequent strategy of the
paramilitaries, it was not the only such pact between them and politicians during this period. In the southern
plains, paramilitary leader Hector Buitrago (Martin Llanos) organized a meeting in 2000 with all the candidates
running for the governor’s and the mayor’s o￿ces and explicitly traded political support against key positions in
the local executive, allocations of public contracts, and a share in the resources of the municipality (\La Sombra
de Martin Llanos" Semana, October 8, 2007). In Puerto Berio, Antioquia, four congressmen from Santander met
with paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso in 2001 for a similar pact. In the Municipalities of Chivolo and Pivijay
18This change in the strategy of the AUC will be crucial to our empirical approach, allowing us
to investigate how electoral outcomes change di￿erentially in high paramilitary areas before and
after their involvement in politics in 2001.
The other notable, and related, development during the 2002 election is the emergence of
brand new political parties, which we refer to as ‘third parties,’ such as Cambio Radical and
MIPOL. These parties often had explicit or implicit links with the paramilitaries, and the case
study evidence shows that paramilitary pressure was often to increase the vote for these parties.
In many paramilitary-controlled areas they have replaced the traditional Liberal and Conservative
parties. We will use the vote share of ‘third parties’ as a measure of paramilitary in￿uence on
electoral outcomes.
Beginning in 2005 there were increasing accusations of involvement of the AUC in the elections
of 2002. Scandal mounted further with the demobilization of Jorge 40 and his 2,000 strong block
on March 10, 2006 in La Mesa, C￿ esar. Jorge 40’s computer fell into the hands of government
o￿cials and it contained emails ordering his men to recruit peasants to pretend to be paramilitaries
during demobilization ceremonies.19 The computer also listed over 500 murders and detailed many
links between politicians and paramilitaries. These accusations led to intense scrutiny of the 2002
election results many of which exhibit some rather extraordinary features. These include massive
changes in voting patterns and very high concentrations of votes for some candidates in particular
municipalities.20
Since then there have been many investigations of supposed links between politicians and
paramilitaries and a large case study literature has emerged documenting such links (see in par-
ticular the research of L￿ opez, 2007, Valencia, 2007, and the other essays in Romero, 2007, Serrano
Zabala, 2007 and the web site verdadabierta.com). As of May 29, 2009, 39 members of Congress
and the Senate were under investigation, 36 were arrested and in detention, and 11 had been found
guilty of links with paramilitaries.21 In total this represents almost 1/3 of Colombian legislators.
Those previously arrested but released include Mario Uribe, President Uribe’s cousin and main
political adviser. Those arrested include Senator Carlos Garc￿ ￿a, the President of the \U party"
(U for Uribe|though this party is not o￿cially recognized by the President as his party). The
investigation and arrest of these politicians has been undertaken primarily by the Supreme Court.
of the department of Magdalena (discussed in the Appendix), the pact with the paramilitaries involved 417 local
politicians that committed to support the candidates linked with the paramilitaries for the legislative elections
of 2002 through a movement called \Movimimiento la Provincia Unida" (Movement United Province) (Semana,
November 6, 2006).
19See also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2007, p. 5) on the apparently fake demobilizations in
C￿ esar.
20See for instance the article in the Colombian weekly Semana \Votaciones at￿ ￿picas en las elecciones de congreso
del 2002," September 11, 2005.
21This data is updated regularly on http://www.indepaz.org.co.
193.4 Controlling the Vote
There is considerable case study evidence that following the meeting in Santa F￿ e de Ralito,
paramilitary groups actively tried and succeeded in in￿uencing votes in national elections (that
is, in the 2002 and 2006 elections). The testimony of major paramilitary leaders suggests that these
groups replaced the authority of the state in many areas and many of the paramilitary leaders
have been quite articulate about their ‘political project’. Of these the testimony of Salvatore
Mancuso is perhaps most telling, noting that
\What I said is that 35% of the Congress was elected in areas where there were
states of the Self-Defense groups, in those states we were the ones collecting taxes,
we delivered justice, and we had the military and territorial control of the region and
all the people who wanted to go into politics had to come and deal with the political
representatives we had there." (Salvatore Mancuso, second 53 of the Interview, authors
translation)."22
The investigation into the 2002 and 2006 election results and the testimony of demobilized
paramilitaries has revealed a large number of di￿erent ‘pacts’ between paramilitary leaders and
politicians (detailed in L￿ opez and Sevillano, 2008) and also demonstrates that a large number of
di￿erent strategies were used to guarantee that candidates preferred by paramilitaries won elec-
tions. A salient strategy seems to have been to terrorize people into voting for speci￿c candidates.
In the municipality of San Onofre in the coastal department of Sucre,23 for example, this was
arranged by the paramilitary leader ‘Cadena’.
\For the elections of 2002, the trucks sent by ‘Cadena’ went through neighborhoods
and rural areas of San Onofre picking people up. According to some people in this
municipality in Sucre, thousands of peasants were taken to the corregimiento ‘Plan
Parejo’ so they could see the candidate for whom they had to vote for in the legislative
elections: Jairo Merlano for Senate and Muriel Benito for the House of Representatives.
‘Cadena’ put in a bag all the names of the councilors, he took two and said that he
was going to kill them and other people chosen randomly if Muriel did not win", says
a peasant from this town. The threat seems to have been e￿ective: each candidate
obtained 40,000 votes in Sucre."24
22The exact words in Spanish are \Lo que dije fue que el 35 % del congreso fue elegido en zonas
donde hab￿ ￿an Estados de Autodefensas, en esos Estados nosotros fuimos los que cobramos impuestos,
impart￿ ￿amos justicia, tenemos el control territorial y militar de la regi￿ on y todas esta personas que
quer￿ ￿an hacer pol￿ ￿tica ten￿ ￿an que venir y concertar con los representantes pol￿ ￿ticos que ten￿ ￿amos ah￿ ￿."
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0tsaMNqoa k&feature=related
23Interestingly the mayor and ex-mayor of San Onofre were both signatories of the Pact of Santa F￿ e de Ralito.
24Quoted from \Redacci￿ on Nacional" El Tiempo November 11, 2006. In Spanish: \Los camiones enviados por
‘Cadena’ pasaron por barrios, corregimientos y veredas de San Onofre recogiendo gente. Fue para las elecciones
20Sheer terror seems to have been used not just to induce people to vote for particular candidates
but also to keep them away from the polls so that ballot stu￿ng and other forms of manipulation
of vote totals could occur. Evidence of the use of coercion to keep people at home and away from
the polls comes from La Jagua de Ib￿ ￿rico in the department of C￿ esar.25
Another strategy, where coercion also played an important role, involved collecting people’s
cedulas (national identity cards which a person must produce to vote) from their houses, using
them to collect the ballots (the ‘tarjeton’) and ￿lling them in for people.26
Further evidence on how votes were delivered emerged during the testimony of Rafael Garc￿ ￿a
Torres, the former director of information services for the Presidential intelligence service, the
Administrative Security Department (DAS). Garc￿ ￿a, under investigation for links with paramili-
taries, told prosecutors that he had designed a computer program to use con￿dential information
\that told us the list of voters by any category, for example, by polling station, zone, municipality
and even by departments." With this information in hand counterfeit ballots were created so
\that by the end of the elections they would include fake votes of the people who did not vote,
and if there were ballots favoring other candidates di￿erent from the ones from the paramilitary
group Bloque Norte they would be replaced by ballots for our candidates".27
All in all the evidence indicates that paramilitary groups used a wide variety of strategies to
make sure that their preferred candidates got elected. This ranged from terrorizing voters to vote
in particular ways, terrorizing them to stay away from the polls so they could stu￿ ballots, voting
instead of citizens by con￿scating their identify cards, terrorizing politicians so that they would
del 2002 y seg￿ un cuentan algunos habitantes de ese municipio de Sucre, centenares de campesinos fueron llevados
hasta el corregimiento Plan Parejo para que les vieran la cara a los candidatos por los que hab￿ ￿a que votar en las
parlamentarias: Jairo Merlano para Senado y Muriel Benito Rebollo para C￿ amara.
Cadena puso en una bolsa los nombres de todos los concejales, sac￿ o dos y dijo que los matar￿ ￿a a ellos y a otras
personas que iba a escoger al azar si Muriel no ganaba", dice un campesino de esa localidad. La amenaza parece
haber sido efectiva: cada candidato sac￿ o 40 mil votos en todo Sucre."
25From ‘Un Abrebocasa de estas Elecciones" by Cristina Velez in Votebien.com, February 2006.
26This phenomenon is discussed in the article \Aqu￿ ￿ nadie es un santo" Semana, September 29, 2007.
27According to the testimony given by Mrs. Judith Esther Salas Vallejo: \The [electoral] juries also marked
ballots, because they were told to do so. And this happened during the afternoon since the turnout was very low that
day and they had to deliver certain number of votes that did not been cast by then." This behavior was also witnessed
in Salamina and Remolino. One of the counsels sent by the paramilitaries told the juries that \the turnout is very low
and we have to deliver the votes they are expecting and therefore the juries had to collaborate. If they did not comply
these demands there would be consequences". See http://www.cambio.com.co/portadacambio/712/ARTICULO-
WEBNOTA INTERIOR CAMBIO-3444866.html.
Other evidence reveals both the extent to which the political project of the paramilitaries was planned and
also how votes were guaranteed. Semana documented how paramilitary leaders and politicians divided up coastal
departments. For instance: \In C￿ esar, \Jorge 40" aimed to obtain two Senators and four Representatives. The
department was divided into 3 electoral districts, one in the north and one in the south. Each of the candidates
would campaign in only one of those districts and each of these would support two candidates for the House of
Representatives. The third district would be open to free competition. To organize the lists they did everything,
from threats and expropriation of land to kidnappings. They killed Luis Laborde, former mayor of Copey and
candidate to the House of Representatives, who did not want to \play" the rules of the game that were imposed
by the AUC. \\Jorge 40" announced this crime in a meeting in San Angel, in which there were 9 mayors of the
department" says a witness. Since that moment it was completely clear that anyone who did not comply with
\Jorge 40’s" rules could not do politics" (Semana, November 25th 2006).
21not run against their preferred candidates, and manipulating subsequent vote totals electronically.
3.5 The Involvement of Other Armed Actors in Politics
Our empirical results will show that the AUC more than any non-state armed actor has been
signi￿cantly in￿uencing elections in Colombia. Scattered pieces of evidence suggest that other
non-state armed actors have been involved, but have not pursued such a consistent electoral
strategy. For instance the drug lord Pablo Escobar got himself elected as an alternate for a list to
Congress in 1982 for the Liberal party and it is very likely that he and members of the Medell￿ ￿n
drug cartel had big impacts on elections in Antioquia, though to our knowledge the data have
never been systematically analyzed. Nevertheless, electoral strategies can be dangerous. Escobar’s
election drew a lot of attention to him, which was probably not to the advantage of his business
interests and no doubt strengthened the resolve of the state to move against him. Similarly in the
1980s when the FARC formed a party to contest elections, the Uni￿ on Patri￿ otica (UP- Patriotic
Union) many of their supporters and candidates including their Presidential candidates in the
1986 and 1990 elections were murdered.
The FARC and ELN have also certainly in￿uenced some elections and have used their power
to sway or intimidate voters in favor of candidates they preferred. They have threatened and
killed politicians. However, their involvement in elections has been more limited than that of
the AUC. We conjecture that this is mostly because the FARC and ELN have been ideologically
opposed to the institutions of the state in Colombia and their project was to overthrow the
national government. As also emphasized by our theoretical discussion in subsection 2.5, this
made a symbiotic relationship between them and the executive impossible. In contrast, the AUC
are a continuation of local paramilitary groups allied with local elites and politicians. Again in
light of our discussion in subsection 2.5, it was important that the AUC did not want to overthrow
the state but to exercise control over certain peripheral areas and in￿uence key legislation. This
created a platform for a symbiotic relationship between the central state and the AUC, which
would have been impossible for the FARC and ELN.
3.6 The Colombian Political System
Here we emphasize a few institutional details of the Colombian system that are important for our
empirical strategy. Under the 1991 Constitution the President of Colombia was elected for one
four year term with no possibility of re-election. There has been a strong norm against re-election
historically in Colombia and the last President to succeed himself was Rafael N￿ u~ nez in 1886.
Though under the 1886 Constitution re-election was permitted if not successive, it only happened
once with Alfonso L￿ opez Pumarejo being President between 1934 and 1938 and again between
1942 and 1945 (when he ended his second term early by resigning). The President is elected by
a national vote and if no candidate receives 50% of the vote in the ￿rst round a run-o￿ election
22is held between the two candidates with the largest number of votes in the ￿rst round.
It is also important to note that like most Presidential systems in Latin America, Colombia’s
features strong Presidential dominance of the legislature with Presidents often ruling for long
periods by issuing decrees.
For the Senate there is a national constituency where 100 Senators are elected from lists. For
the Congress there are 32 multi-member districts with each district corresponding to a department.
The representation of departments depends on their population and there are 162 Congressmen
in total. Historically in Colombia even traditional party lists are very personalized so the typical
situation is one where only one candidate is elected from each list. This situation did not change
with the 2006 elections even though a reform in the electoral law stipulated that to win a seat
in the legislature a list had to have at least 2% of the vote nationally. At the same time as
this law was introduced, the electoral system was changed to allow for open-list proportional
representation (with preference voting). Thus even though the number of lists fell dramatically,
personal politics continued unabated via preference voting.
The organization of the Higher Courts in Colombia is rather intricate. There are four High
Courts: the Supreme Court, the Conseil d’ Etat (State Council), the Superior Council of the
Judiciary and the Constitutional Court. While the ￿rst two have been in place since the 1886
Colombian Constitution (although with some alterations), the latter ones were a creation of the
1991 Constitution. For the purposes of paramilitary involvement in politics it is relevant to brie￿y
understand the basics of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. The Supreme Court’s
main role is to review judgments of inferior (provincial) courts and decide whether there has been
a correct interpretation of the law and/or the facts of the cases. The Court is divided in three
sections: criminal, civil and labor. The Criminal Section of the Supreme Court is also in charge
of trying and judging \the members of the Congress: Senate and Chamber of Representatives"
(Article 235 # 3 { Constitution). This gives the Supreme Court the authority to judge members
of Congress accused of having links with paramilitary groups. Some members of Congress, once
investigations for paramilitary links have started, have stepped down from their public o￿ce to
avoid the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and have subjected themselves to ordinary procedures
under \lower-scale" prosecutors and judges.
The Constitutional Court has two types of roles: on the one hand it is in charge of reviewing
the judgment of provincial and sectional judges regarding ‘acciones de tutela,’ which is a procedure
that any person can start {generally against public o￿cials{ in order to seek the protection of
his/her fundamental rights. On the other hand the Constitutional Court is in charge of judicial
review of legislation. In this role the Court determines whether a particular statute (law enacted by
Congress) is constitutional. The Constitution provides that some statutes should be automatically
reviewed by the Court, while in other cases the Court will only intervene when a citizen challenges
the constitutionality of a particular statute. In the case of the Justice and Peace Law, the
23Constitutional Court reviewed its constitutionality thanks to a challenge posed by a group of
citizens (under Article 241 of the 1991 Constitution).
There is a relatively high degree of autonomy of these High Courts vis-￿ a-vis the Executive
Branch, particularly the Supreme Court. There is no life tenure for the Justices in Colombia:
instead they serve during one eight-year term and re-election to the same court is explicitly
forbidden by the Constitution. When a Justice serves his time, the Supreme Court is in charge of
choosing a replacement from lists prepared by the Administrative Section of the Superior Council
of the Judiciary (another High Court also in charge of administrative functions regarding the
judiciary). In turn, the justices of the Administrative Section are appointed by the Constitutional
Court (1 judge), by the Supreme Court (2 judges) and by the Conseil d’Etat (3 judges). The
impact of the legislative and executive branches is therefore very indirect on the Supreme Court.
They can to some extent in￿uence this process. For instance the Constitutional Court has 9
judges elected for life by the Senate. However, the election takes place over lists of candidates
presented by the President (3 judges), the Supreme Court (3 judges) and the Conseil d’Etat (3
judges). Thus, from the nine justices sitting on the Constitutional Court in a particular term,
three of them have come out from lists presented by the President.
4 The Data
4.1 Data Sources and Construction
The most important data for the paper are on the presence of non-state armed actors, speci￿cally
paramilitaries and left-wing guerillas. Our main measure of the presence of non-state armed actors
is one based on con￿ict incidents, which we refer to as ‘attacks’ for short. The database of attacks
is from Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Econ￿ omico (CEDE) in the Facultad de Econom￿ ￿a at
the Universidad de Los Andes in Bogot￿ a. CEDE collects data from the Observatory of Human
Rights of the Vice-presidency and the National Department of Planning and aggregates variables
in several categories by armed actor and type of action. The original data are a compilation of news
from newspapers and from reports of the national police. Our measure of attacks is constructed
by aggregating over many of these variables. For each armed actor we simply add the following
variables: explosive terrorist acts, incendiary terrorist acts, other terrorist acts, assaults to private
property, attacks on civil organizations, political assassination attempts, road blockades, armed
contact between state and non-state armed forces initiated by the latter, ambushes of civilians,
harassing (mainly threats to civilians), incursion into ‘villages’, overland piracy, illegal checkpoints,
armed forces wounded by the non-state armed group, murders of civilians, murders of politicians,
massacres, deaths of members of the state armed forces, kidnappings of members of the armed
forces, kidnappings of politicians and kidnappings of civilians. We have this variable for each year
in the period 1997 to 2005.
24We check the robustness of our results with an alternative measure of the presence of non-
state armed actors based on displaced people. The database from which we constructed our
displaced measure comes from Acci￿ on Social an agency created by the presidency. This data is
collected from people that report themselves and are classi￿ed as displaced in the Registro ￿ Unico
de Poblaci￿ on Desplazada (unique register of displaced population) in order to obtain a set of
subsidies. These data specify the municipality where the displacement originated, the year of the
displacement and the armed actor that originated it. We have these data annually for the period
1997 and 2006.
We use these data to construct various measures of the presence of non-state armed actors.
Because the time series variation in both the attacks and the displaced measures appears to be
quite noisy, we focus on ‘averages’ of these data, though we also exploit over-time variation in some
speci￿cations. Our ￿rst main measure of paramilitary presence, referred to as paramilitary attacks,
is total paramilitary attacks between 1997 and 2005 in municipality m per 1000 inhabitants where
the population measure is the average population between the 1993 and 2005 censuses. Our second
measure is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if municipality m has a value of paramilitary attacks
above the 75th percentile.28 We also construct two similar measures with the displaced variable
and identical measures for guerrilla attacks (FARC and ELN combined).
We take elections results from the Senate, Congress and Presidential elections 1991-2006 from
the Registradur￿ ￿a Nacional del Estado Civil. Using the names of the political parties to which
politicians belonged, we constructed party vote shares in each municipality. We then classi￿ed
parties into ‘third’, ‘left’ and ‘traditional’ (Liberals or Conservatives) political parties, and calcu-
lated the vote share of third parties in each municipality.29 For Presidential elections we took the
numbers from the ￿rst round election results.
In addition to the third party vote share, we also investigate the e￿ect of paramilitaries on
electoral outcomes by looking at electoral concentration. This is motivated by the case study
evidence from Magdalena, which is discussed in the Appendix, which shows how paramilitary
in￿uence creates a highly concentrated vote share pattern in a few municipalities (where they
have presumably used coercion or manipulated the vote). Electoral concentration is de￿ned as
the vote share of the most popular list in a municipality (for the Senate or Congress, and in the
tables it is referred to as ‘winning votes share’).30 Finally, we obtained data from two crucial
roll-call votes from the Gacetas del Senado.31
28Less than half of the municipalities have any paramilitary Attacks; in contrast, only two municipalities have
zero Displacements, though several municipalities have very low levels.
29Given our focus on the impact of the AUC, when we examine votes for third parties, we do not consider parties
in the left-wing coalition, the Polo Democr￿ atico (‘Democratic pole’), which are unconnected with the paramilitaries,
as ‘third parties’. See Valencia (2007) for a similar distinction and calculation.
30The results using a Her￿ndahl index to measure electoral concentration are very similar and omitted to save
space.
31Roll-calls are not taken for most votes in either the Senate or Congress.
25As controls, we collected data on the vote share of ￿ Alvaro G￿ omez in the 1986 Presidential
election to construct a measure of the extent of ‘right-wing’ support in a municipality. G￿ omez
was the son of the right wing conservative President Laureano G￿ omez from the earlier 1950s and
ran on a very conservative platform as the Presidential candidate for the Conservative party.
Similarly, we use the vote share of Jaime Pardo Leal the Presidential candidate for the Uni￿ on
Patri￿ otica in the same election. Since the Uni￿ on Patri￿ otica was the uno￿cial political wing of the
FARC, Pardo Leal’s vote share is a good measure of ‘left-wing’ support in a municipality. In many
of our regressions, we also include interactions between a full set of time dummies and various
municipality-level controls. These controls are the land Gini in 1985, the area of the municipality,
altitude, distance to state capital, average municipality population between 1993 and 2005, an
index of how rural the population of the municipality is (in 1993), an index of ‘unful￿lled basic
needs’ in 1993, proxying for the level of poverty in the municipality, and dummies for coca
cultivation in 1994 and opium cultivation in 1994 (these controls are from the CEDE database).
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics. Columns 1 and 2 report the mean and standard devia-
tion of the variables for the whole sample. Columns 3-6 report the same two variables for high
paramilitary areas where we use the attacks dummy de￿ned in the last section to decide whether
or not a municipality has high paramilitary presence.
The ￿rst two sets of rows show the rapid increase in paramilitary presence between 1996-1997
and 2000-2001 with some evidence that this fell in 2004-2005. Interestingly, the next set of rows
show a similar increase in guerilla presence (with no tendency to fall in the most recent period,
despite President Uribe’s intensi￿cation of the war against the FARC). Looking at columns 3
and 5 it is evident that there is a positive correlation between paramilitary presence and guerilla
presence, which is not surprising since, as we discussed above, paramilitary units were often
formed to combat the guerilla.
There are several noteworthy features of the data highlighted by Table 2. Rows 9-12 show a
large increase in the share of third parties after 2002, and this increase is more pronounced in
high paramilitary areas. Our measure of electoral concentration also increases after 2002, and
this is again largely concentrated in high paramilitary areas (rows 13-16). Finally, rows 17 and
18 show a noticeable increase in the vote share of the winning presidential candidate in the high
paramilitary areas. These patterns give a preview of our regression evidence that will be presented
in the next section, as part of the evidence of paramilitary involvement in politics.
Rows 19-24 show that there are also some notable di￿erences between high and low paramili-
tary areas in terms of the covariates. Most importantly, low paramilitary areas appear to be more
‘right-wing’. This is reassuring in connection with the concerns that our measure of paramilitary
presence will capture latent right-wing leanings. There are also some di￿erences in terms of other
26covariates, though these appear relatively small.
5 The Impact of Non-State Actors on Elections
We now investigate econometrically the impact of non-state armed actors on electoral outcomes,
starting with their impact on the vote share of third parties. Our basic regressions will be from
a simple panel data model of the following form:
ym;t = dt + ￿m + ￿t ￿ Pm + ￿t ￿ Gm + X0
m;t ￿ ￿ + "m;t; (7)
where ym;t is the outcome variable in municipality m at time t, the dt’s denote time e￿ects, the
￿m’s are municipality ￿xed e￿ects, Xm;t is a vector of covariates, which contains the interactions
between various geographic and political controls at the municipality level (described above) and a
full set of time dummies that are included in some speci￿cations; "m;t is an error term representing
all omitted factors. Most importantly, Pm is our time-invariant measure of paramilitary presence
and Gm as the corresponding measure of guerilla presence. The term ￿t ￿ Pm therefore estimates
a potentially di￿erential growth e￿ect for every time period (relative to the base, initial date).
This speci￿cation will enable us to focus on whether there is a change in an outcome variable
(for example, the third party vote share) after the AUC become involved in politics. Our ￿rst
dependent variable will be the vote share of third parties, proxying for the direct e￿ect of the
AUC in elections, and we have these data for the 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006 elections.
This enables us to include interactions with the 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006 dummies and our
measures of paramilitary presence as a check against pre-existing trends (1991 election is the
omitted category). Our working hypothesis that the AUC in￿uenced elections and forced citizens
to vote for certain lists (or used ballot stu￿ng) implies ￿t > 0 after 2002.
We also experimented with empirical models of the following form
ym;t = dt + ￿m + ￿t ￿ Pm;t￿1 + ￿ ￿ Pm;t￿1 + ￿t ￿ Gm;t￿1 + ￿ ￿ Gm;t￿1 + X0
m;t ￿ ￿ + "m;t; (8)
which include both a time-varying main e￿ect of paramilitary and guerrilla presence, and focus
on the interaction between year e￿ects and the time-varying measures. The disadvantage of this
model is that, as noted above, year-to-year variation in paramilitary and guerrilla presence is often
due to measurement error. To minimize the impact of year-to-year variations, we estimate (8)
only using the election years for 1998, 2002 and 2006 and construct two dummy variables Pm;t￿1
and Gm;t￿1 using the two years prior to the election. We then set Pm;t￿1 = 1 if municipality m is
above the 75th percentile. Gm;t￿1 is constructed similarly. For the 1998 election we just use the
1997 data, for 2002 we used data from 2000 and 2001, and so on. Equation (8) also includes the
direct e￿ects of Pm;t￿1 and Gm;t￿1.
275.1 Paramilitary E￿ect on Elections|Third Parties
We ￿rst investigate the impact of paramilitary presence on the vote share of third parties in the
Senate elections. More speci￿cally, we estimate equations (7) and (8), with the dependent variable
ym;t corresponding to the vote share of third parties in municipality m in the elections for Senate
at time t. Our basic results, using the attacks measure, are reported in Table 3. In this and all
subsequent tables, all standard errors are fully robust (allowing for arbitrary serial correlation at
the municipality level), and Tables 3-7 include a full set of municipality and time dummies in all
speci￿cations.
Table 3 shows a robust positive and signi￿cant e￿ect in both 2002 and 2006 of paramilitary
presence on the vote share of third parties. For example, column 1 estimates ^ ￿2002 = 20:97 with
a standard error of 3.14 and a similar estimate for 2006, ^ ￿2006 = 22:10 (s.e.=3.19). Both esti-
mates are highly statistically signi￿cant and quantitatively large (the magnitudes will be discussed
below).
Column 2 adds our basic covariates (the land Gini in 1985, the area of the municipality,
altitude, distance to state capital, average population between 1993 and 2005, the index of rurality,
the index of unful￿lled basic needs, dummies for coca and opium cultivation, and our measures of
right and left leanings of the municipalities), all interacted with a full set of time dummies so as
to allow for di￿erential e￿ects over time. To save space, we do not report the coe￿cients on these
time interactions. The results in column 2 are similar to those in column 1, slightly smaller, though
still highly signi￿cant (15.88 for 2002 and 10.79 for 2006). In column 3, we include interactions
with guerrilla presence as well as our main interactions of paramilitary presence and time. These
interactions are insigni￿cant, consistent with the hypothesis that the left-wing guerrillas have
played a much more limited role in national politics.32
The next three columns re-estimate the same models of the ￿rst three columns but now
using the attacks dummy as the measure of paramilitary and guerilla presence. The results are
very similar to the ￿rst three columns. For example, in column 4, we estimate ^ ￿2002 = 13:71
(s.e.=1.98) and ^ ￿2006 = 14:54 (s.e.=1.99), which are again statistically highly signi￿cant. The
estimates in columns 5 and 6 are very similar. These estimates also clearly show the quantitative
e￿ects of paramilitary involvement. They imply that high paramilitary areas have, on average,
10 percentage points higher vote share for third parties after the AUC’s involvement in politics.
This is a very sizable e￿ect, particularly in view of the fact that the average vote share of third
parties before 2001 was about 15 percent (Table 2).
Prior to 2002, as the coe￿cients ^ ￿1994 and ^ ￿1998 illustrate there is no robust positive relation-
ship between paramilitary presence and third party vote share. Though both of these coe￿cients
are positive and signi￿cant in column 1, their signi￿cance vanishes when we add the covariates for
32This is not because we are focusing on the vote share of third parties. When we repeat these regressions using
the vote share of the socialist coalition of parties, interactions with guerrilla presence are still insigni￿cant.
28columns 2 and 3. In column 4 ^ ￿1994 is again positive and signi￿cant, though ^ ￿1998 is not. As with
the attacks data in levels these coe￿cients become completely insigni￿cant once the covariates
are added in columns 5 and 6.
One concern with the results in columns 1-6 is that the change in the coe￿cient of the time
interactions might re￿ect the changing importance of paramilitaries or guerrillas in certain areas.
Our data are not ideal to investigate these issues, since the year-to-year variation in the military
and guerrilla presence are measured with considerable error. Nevertheless, in columns 7 and 8,
we estimate equation (8) to provide some answers to these questions. The most parsimonious
speci￿cation is presented in column 7. The results here are consistent with those in the ￿rst 6
columns using our time-invariant measure of paramilitary presence. The estimated coe￿cients are
^ ￿2002 = 17:81 (s.e.=2.87) and ^ ￿2006 = 18:02 (s.e.=3.01), and are highly statistically signi￿cant.33
Table 4 shows the results for the votes for the Congress. The general patterns and in fact even
the point estimates are very similar to those in Table 3, with high paramilitary areas showing
about a 8 percentage points higher vote shares for third parties after the AUC’s involvement in
politics. Nevertheless, the results are weaker than in Table 3, and in column 6 where we use
the attacks dummy with the full set of covariates and guerilla presence neither ^ ￿2002 not ^ ￿2006
statistically signi￿cant. Importantly, ^ ￿1994 and ^ ￿1998 are small and statistically insigni￿cant in
all speci￿cations in Table 4.
Table 5 investigates the robustness of these results further (focusing on the votes for the
Senate; the results for the Congress are similar). In this table, all speci￿cations include the
time interactions with the full set of covariates introduced above, including the interactions with
guerrilla presence (which are reported in the table, while other covariates are again not reported
to save space). The ￿rst column again estimates (7), but uses the levels of displaced people
as the presence measure for both paramilitary and guerilla presence. Now we see that, less
supportive of our hypothesis, the estimates for the interactions between all the time dummies
and the displaced measure of paramilitary presence are statistically signi￿cant (though the point
estimates are di￿erent because the scale of the displaced variable is di￿erent). However, there
is a large increase in the size of the coe￿cient in 2002, though it halves in 2006. In column 2
we use the dummy version of the displaced measure of paramilitary presence with results very
similar to those in column 1 except that now the quantitative magnitudes of ^ ￿2002 and ^ ￿2006 are
similar. Because we are now using a dummy variable for measuring paramilitary presence, the
quantitative e￿ects can also be directly compared to those in Table 3. The estimates suggest that
high paramilitary areas experienced about 12 percentage points increase in the vote share of third
parties in 2002 and 2006, which is broadly consistent with the quantitative e￿ects in Table 3.
33Notice that the direct e￿ect of paramilitary presence is negative. We conjecture that this is because paramili-
taries appear to have had a very strong e￿ect on elections in departments on the Caribbean coast, such as Magdalena,
Sucre, C￿ orboda and C￿ esar. The third parties that existed prior to 2002 were not strong in these areas, hence the
negative correlation between paramilitary presence and third party vote share in 1998.
29In column 3 we again use the displaced measure, but now exploit the time series variation in
the data estimating model (8). Here the estimates are imprecise and insigni￿cant, though still
positive. In column 4, we use a di￿erent strategy and extract the principal component of the
attacks and displaced measures, and use this principal component as our measure of paramilitary
presence. The advantage of this strategy is that both attacks and displaced numbers are noisy,
thus their common component may contain more information. The results from this approach are
very much in line with those of Tables 3 and 4. We ￿nd no impact of paramilitary presence prior
to 2002 but a positive and highly signi￿cant one afterwards. In column 5, we use yet another
strategy and construct a dummy that takes the value 1 if in our data a municipality has high
paramilitary presence according to both our attacks data and our displaced data (according to
this measure all areas for which we have data for displaced numbers but for which the attacks
data are missing receive a value of zero). We construct a similar dummy for the guerilla presence
measures. The results using this combined dummy are again very similar to our basic ￿nding
though ^ ￿1998 is now statistically signi￿cant. Finally, in column 6, we estimate the model (8), but
now using a time-varying dummy constructed combining information from attacks and displaced
numbers as in column 5. In contrast to the imprecise results in column 3, the estimates now are
consistent with the rest of our results and are highly signi￿cant.
A major concern for our empirical strategy is that paramilitary groups may be selecting into
speci￿c areas based on their political or ideological characteristics; paramilitary presence may be
capturing a trend towards third parties unrelated to the paramilitaries’ involvement in politics
(this has to be a trend, since all speci￿cations include a full set of municipality ￿xed e￿ects).
For example, there might be a trend in ‘conservative ideology’ in certain areas, and the increased
vote share of third parties is a re￿ection of this trend in the areas where they have situated.
While we cannot rule out this alternative explanation for the patterns shown in Tables 3-5, we
do not ￿nd it very plausible. First, the speci￿cations with covariates ￿exibly control for potential
di￿erential trends in ‘right-wing ideology’ by interacting the vote share of ￿ Alvaro G￿ omez in the
1986 Presidential election with a full set of time dummies (as well as for potential di￿erential
trends in ‘left-wing ideology’). Remarkably, this has almost no e￿ect on the estimates. Second,
the case study evidence discussed in Section 3 supports our interpretation.
Overall, Tables 3-5 provide robust correlations consistent with our basic hypothesis that fol-
lowing the AUC’s decision to become involved in politics, paramilitaries have systematically in-
￿uenced electoral outcomes. The next two subsections provide further evidence consistent with
this pattern.
5.2 Results on Electoral Concentration: Senate and Congress
Motivated by the case study evidence from Magdalena, discussed in the Appendix, we hypothesize
that paramilitary involvement also translated into greater electoral concentration (greater vote
30share for the winning list in the Senate and Congress elections). Table 6 investigates this issue
by estimating regressions similar to (7) and (8), with the dependent variable being the vote share
of the most popular list in either the Senate or the Congress in municipality m at time t. For
these regressions, we again have data from 1991 to 2006. Throughout, we focus on the attacks
measure to save space (the results with the displaced measured are very similar and are available
upon request).
The ￿rst six columns in Table 6 use data from the Senate, while the last six are for the
Congress. Each of these sets of columns is broken down into three sets of two which use ￿rst the
attacks data in levels, then the attacks dummy for high paramilitary and guerilla presence, and
￿nally the time varying attacks dummy. All columns include the full set of covariates (interacted
with a full set of time dummies).
This table shows no di￿erential trend in electoral concentration between high and low paramil-
itary areas before 2002. There is also no di￿erential trend at any point between high and low
guerrilla areas. There is a large spike in electoral concentration in 2002 in high paramilitary areas,
which is visible in columns 1-4 and 7-10. This e￿ect disappears in 2006, and is not visible or is
only imprecisely estimated in speci￿cations that use the time-varying measures (the regression
equation (8), cfr. columns 5, 6, 11 and 12). The quantitative e￿ects in 2002 are large, correspond-
ing to about a 4-5 percentage points increase in the vote share of the winning candidate (list).
This is again a very large e￿ect, as the vote share of the winning list in Senate and Congress
elections was around 30 percent before 2001.
An obvious question is why there is no di￿erential e￿ect on electoral concentration in high
paramilitary areas in 2006. The answer to this question is suggested by our discussion of the
evidence from Magdalena in the Appendix and by the arguments advanced by Valencia (2007)
and L￿ opez (2007): after the experience of 2002, which was subsequently highly scrutinized in
places such as Magdalena, paramilitaries became much more skilled at manipulating the outcomes
in order to guarantee the election of their candidates without drawing so much attention to
themselves. As we show in the Appendix, even if electoral concentration fell in Magdalena in
2006, Senators supported by the paramilitaries were re-elected and with a rather similar number
of votes, but now spread more evenly throughout the department. Indeed, recalling the evidence
of Table 1, the presence in the legislature after 2006 of so many Senators and Congressmen
either under investigation or arrested for connections with paramilitaries is direct evidence of a
continuing impact of the paramilitaries on elections. This interpretation is also supported by the
evidence presented in the previous subsection (Tables 3-5), which showed the robust association
between paramilitary presence and the rise of third parties in the elections of both 2002 and
2006. Had the e￿ect of the paramilitaries on the electoral outcomes weakened in 2006, we would
have seen this in a decline in the vote share of third parties. The results from the votes for the
executive, presented in the next subsection, further corroborate this interpretation.
315.3 Results for the Executive
Table 7 presents estimates from regression models similar to (7) and (8) for the period 1998-2006,
with ym;t de￿ned as the share of votes of the winning Presidential candidate in municipality m at
time t. Once again we focus on the attacks measure (the results with the displaced measure are
again very similar). The basic robust ￿nding is that in both 2002 and in 2006 the vote share of the
winning candidate (￿ Alvaro Uribe) was systematically higher in high paramilitary areas than the
vote share of the winning candidate in 1998 (Pastrana); this e￿ect is in fact considerably stronger
in 2006. For example, the estimate in column 4, 11.45 (s.e. = 1.67) suggests that Uribe obtained
about 11 percentage points more votes in high paramilitary areas than Pastrana did. The same
e￿ect is present in models that exploit the time-varying measures of paramilitary presence (models
as in (8)).
The pattern with a stronger e￿ect in 2006 is plausible. President Uribe was favored by
paramilitary groups already in 2002, but after his support for policies in line with these groups’
interests during his ￿rst term, the support of the paramilitary groups for his election became
much stronger. This pattern is thus consistent both with the notion that paramilitaries continued
to heavily in￿uence elections after 2002, and also with the hypothesis, documented further below,
that a symbiotic relationship between the executive and the paramilitaries developed after certain
key legislations proposed by Uribe.34
The evidence in this subsection is also particularly important since it suggests that, consistent
with the assumptions of our theoretical model, the executive, President Uribe, electorally bene￿ted
from the presence of paramilitaries.35
5.4 Predicting Arrests
As noted in the Introduction, since the so called ‘Parapol￿ ￿tica’ scandal ￿rst broke in Colombia,
many Congressmen and Senators have been investigated, arrested for and even found guilty of links
with illegal paramilitary organizations. A useful ‘reality check’ on whether the evidence reported
so far indeed represents the in￿uence of paramilitaries on election outcomes is to see whether
Senators elected in areas under paramilitary control have explicit links with the paramilitaries
34Nevertheless, as always, there may be other interpretations of this ￿nding. For instance, to the extent that
President Uribe had been successful in de-mobilizing the paramilitaries, then people who had previously su￿ered
under them might have rewarded the President by supporting his bid for re-election. Although we cannot rule out
this alternative explanation, the case study evidence is more consistent with our proposed interpretation and with
the implications of our model.
35In May 2008, somewhat surprisingly given his insistence that paramilitary crimes should not be extraditable,
President Uribe extradited 14 paramilitary leaders, including Salvatore Mancuso, Jorge 40 and Don Berna. Our
model gives two ways to think about this. First, the more popular President Uribe is with the general population,
the less he needs the paramilitaries. It may therefore not be a coincidence that the extraditions took place soon
after the killing by the military of FARC senior cadre, Ra￿ ul Reyes, which was hugely popular in Colombia. Second,
it is possible that the paramilitary leaders began to develop national political aspirations, which our model suggests
would make Uribe turn against them.
32and have voted for legislation favoring paramilitary interests. In this subsection, we investigate the
presence of explicit links, exploiting the fact that Colombian judiciary, particularly the Supreme
Court, is broadly independent and has prosecuted politicians with links with the paramilitaries.
The voting behavior of these Senators is discussed in the next subsection.
We adopt a simple empirical strategy to measure the extent to which Senators relied on the
support of paramilitaries for their election. First, we de￿ne !lP to be the proportion of total vote
that Senate list l receives in municipalities with high paramilitary presence, where we measure high
paramilitary presence by using our dummy variable constructed from our time-invariant measure
of paramilitary presence. Similarly we de￿ne !lG as the proportion of total vote that list l receives
in municipalities with high guerilla presence, where high guerilla presence is measured in the same
way as paramilitary presence. To investigate the links between Senators and paramilitaries, we
look at Senators who are arrested for connections with paramilitary groups. We de￿ne ￿l as
the proportion of the Senators of list l that have been arrested for alleged connections with
paramilitary groups and then estimate
￿l = ￿ ￿ !l;P + ￿ ￿ !l;G + X0
l ￿ ￿ + "l: (9)
Based on our hypothesis that Senators and Congressmen receiving a high fraction of their votes
in paramilitary areas have explicit connections with paramilitaries, we expect to ￿nd ￿ > 0. In
the covariate vector X0
l we also use party identity. Though, in general, this is an example of
‘bad control’ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, pp. 64-68), since being a member of a third party is
an outcome variable inbetween the causal variable of interest, !l;P, and the outcome variable,
￿l, in this case we include it to examine whether being a member of a third party absorbs all of
the explanatory power of !l;P (thus acting as the channel through which paramilitary presence is
impacting politician behavior and arrests).
Table 8 shows the results from estimating (9). In column 1, we look at the relationship
between arrests and party identity. As we saw above, there is a close correspondence between
paramilitary presence and the rise of third parties. Column 1 con￿rms this, showing that third
party Senators are signi￿cantly more likely to be arrested for links with the paramilitaries than
Liberals, Conservatives and Socialists (liberals are the omitted category).
In the next three columns, columns 2-4, we present estimates of (9) for the Senate. Column 2 is
the most parsimonious speci￿cation where we regress the proportion of Senators on a list who were
arrested on !l;P and !l;G. We see that ^ ￿ = 1:38 (standard error=0.42) is statistically signi￿cant
suggesting that the higher the share of its votes that a list obtained in paramilitary areas, the
greater is the proportion of Senators on the list who are arrested for links with paramilitaries. In
column 3 we add as a covariate the proportion of its vote share that the list obtained in ‘right-
leaning’ and ‘left-leaning’ areas.36 Neither of these controls are signi￿cant in themselves and they
36We de￿ne the ‘right-leaning’ and ‘left-leaning’ dummies again by looking at the vote shares of ￿ Alvaro G￿ omez and
33do not in￿uence the coe￿cients of interest.
In column 4 we then add the party dummies to investigate whether the entire e￿ect of the
paramilitaries is working through third parties. The estimates show that this is not the case.
The third party dummy is still signi￿cant, but so is the share of votes from paramilitary areas.
This suggests that the only channel of in￿uence of paramilitaries on politicians behavior is not
through third party a￿liation (which, in hindsight, is not surprising, since in several municipali-
ties, paramilitaries supported liberal or conservative candidates).
The next four columns report estimates of (9) for the Congress. These are broadly consistent
with the results for the Senate; the proportion of the votes that a list won in high paramilitary
areas is positively correlated with the proportion of Congressmen on that list who have been
arrested, though the results are typically somewhat less precisely estimated and less signi￿cant.
Overall, these results are important ￿rstly because they provide some veri￿cation that our
strategy for measuring the e￿ects of the paramilitaries is indeed capturing what they are supposed
to. Secondly, they also show that our ￿ndings so far are unlikely to be driven by some omitted
characteristic of municipalities (making paramilitary presence ‘endogenous’ to voters’ preferences).
The fact that paramilitary presence is positively correlated with arrests suggests that there is
indeed a close relationship between paramilitaries and politicians such that paramilitary groups are
either forming a coalition with local politicians, or are themselves running as candidates. In either
case, it seems highly unlikely that politicians, particularly politicians elected in high paramilitary
areas, are perfect agents of voters, supporting policies in line with their interests. Instead, it
seems that these politicians are pursuing policies systematically preferred by paramilitaries.
5.5 Voting in the Senate
As a ￿nal demonstration of the potential in￿uence of the paramilitaries on elections, we examine
whether Senators from lists that received large shares of their votes in paramilitary areas vote in
systematically di￿erent ways. We do this in the very speci￿c but revealing context of a roll-call
vote to re-introduce two clauses of the Justice and Peace Law. These were Article 70, which
stipulated a 10% reduction in the sentences of demobilized paramilitaries who had been charged
at the time of the passing of the law and Article 71, which speci￿ed that the crimes of former
paramilitaries should be considered as ‘sedition’.37 The main signi￿cance of sedition is that it
would imply that the paramilitaries had committed political crimes and would therefore not be
eligible to extradition.38 These two articles were part of a ￿rst draft of the law presented by the
Jaime Pardo Leal in 1986; then, similar to the construction of the dummies for paramilitary and guerrilla presence,
we constructed dummy variables for ‘right-leaning’ and ‘left-leaning’ areas depending on whether a municipality is
above the 75th percentile of votes for the corresponding candidate in the 1986 presidential elections.
37At the time of the votes these clauses were actually Article 61 (sentence reduction) and Article 64 (sedition)
but this changed in the ￿nal law.
38This is a topic with a long and contested history in Colombia. During the writing of the 1991 Constitution,
Pablo Escobar systematically tried to intimidate delegates in order to make sure that the new Constitution made
34President but they were both rejected in the ￿rst commissions of the Senate and the Congress.
The rejection of these two articles was then appealed in the Senate. In response to this appeal
a commission was formed to inform the Senate on how to proceed with the appeal pleading.
The members of the commission were Mario Uribe (under arrest in 2008 for connections with
paramilitaries and a cousin of President Uribe), Mauricio Pimiento (arrested and found guilty,
see Table 1), Juan G￿ omez, Miguel de la Espriella (arrested and found guilty, see Table A1), Jes￿ us
Carrizosa, and Hernando Escobar. The members of the commission concluded that the appeal
had to be approved by the plenary of the Senate which it was and we have the roll-call for this
vote. This vote went in favor of re-introducing the two articles into the Justice and Peace law.39
To the extent that there is a positive correlation between the proportion of votes a list received
in paramilitary areas and the proportion of Senators on the list who voted to re-introduce these
two articles, this would be further evidence that paramilitaries have indeed in￿uenced election
outcomes, consistent with Proposition 2 of our model. Implicitly, it is also evidence of the ‘quid
pro quo’ between paramilitaries and the executive, consistent with Proposition 4.40
To examine the impact of the paramilitaries on these roll-call votes, we estimate versions of
model (9) in the previous sub-section. More speci￿cally we now de￿ne ￿l to be the proportion of
Senators on list l that voted in favor of re-introducing these two clauses. The results are reported
in columns 9-12 of Table 8.
Column 9 shows that senators from third parties and the conservatives are most likely to
support the re-introduction of the two controversial articles of the Justice and Peace Law. The
fact that conservatives were as likely as third party candidates to support these clauses is probably
related to the fact that in the Senate they were also allied with President Uribe. The remaining
columns show a positive signi￿cant correlation between paramilitary presence in areas where a list
got a large proportion of its votes and the proportion of Senators who voted in favor of making
the Peace and Justice Law more ‘pro-paramilitary’. (This e￿ect is no longer signi￿cant in column
12 when we introduce the party identity variables, suggesting that a large part of the e￿ect is
working through third party a￿liation). Third party identity is again positive and signi￿cant.
Note also that in none of the speci￿cations is there any e￿ect of guerilla presence or right or left
orientation on these votes. Overall, we interpret this as evidence in support of our hypothesis
that politicians receiving support from paramilitaries have in turn supported legislation in line
with the interests of these groups.
extradition unconstitutional. The day after this was written into the Constitution, Pablo Escobar, who had been
in hiding, gave himself up to the authorities. However, the Constitution was subsequently amended to allow
extradition.
39However the Supreme Court said that paramilitaries cannot be considered as seditious. So article 71 is currently
not being applied. Interestingly, even though President Uribe supported this clause, he then extradited 14 of the
paramilitary leaders as we discussed earlier.
40As we discussed in Section 3, a large literature has heavily criticized the Justice and Peace Law as being very
weak and not forcing ex-combatants to account for their crimes or provide any sort of compensation for their
victims. The structure of the law came from the executive.
356 The Persistence of the Paramilitaries
Having provided some evidence consistent with the assumption that paramilitaries have had
systematic e￿ects on elections in Colombia, we now turn to two predictions of our theoretical
model. First, the model suggests that to the extent that paramilitaries deliver votes to the
President, the President will have a greater incentive to allow them to stay in control of the areas
where they are. Second, this e￿ect will be stronger in places which President Uribe did not expect
to do well without intervention by the paramilitaries.
We focus on the 2002 Presidential election and the subsequent persistence of paramilitaries.
We restrict attention to only municipalities that had paramilitary presence in 2000-2001. A
municipality is classi￿ed as having paramilitary presence if it experienced any paramilitary related
incidents (attacks or displacement depending on the measure used) during either 2000 or 2001.
We use a time varying measure of paramilitary presence to capture presence before the election,
denoted Pm;t<2002, and presence after the election, denoted Pm;t>2002. In our baseline speci￿cation
this is measured as the sum of either attacks or displacements during a two-year window, the
periods 2000 and 2001 (t<2002) or between 2004 and 2005 (t>2002) in either case divided by
the population of the municipality. Our results are robust to di￿erent ways of measuring these
variables as we show. We can use this variable to explicitly examine how the persistence of
paramilitary presence depends on the extent of voting for President Uribe, thus testing the ￿rst
prediction. To test the second implication of the model we argue that even though when Uribe
was Governor of Antioquia he was nominally a representative of the Liberal Party, in fact his key
supporters, in the absence of coercion, were conservative voters who liked his emphasis on law
and order. Direct evidence comes from the fact that the Conservative Party chose not to run
a candidate against him either in 2002 or 2006, while the Liberal Party did (Horacio Serpa in
both cases). As a consequence, Uribe could anticipate doing well in places where Conservative
President Andr￿ es Pastrana had received a high vote share in 1998. We can therefore test the
second hypothesis by interacting Pastrana’s vote share in 1998 with Uribe’s vote share.
More formally, we estimate the following model:
Pm;t>2002 = ￿ ￿ Pm;t<2002 + ￿ ￿ vu
m;2002 + ￿ ￿ vu
m;2002 ￿ v
p
m;1998 + ￿ ￿ v
p
m;1998 + X0
m ￿ ￿ + "m (10)
where vu
m;2002 is the vote share of President Uribe in municipality m in 2002 and v
p
m;1998 is the vote
share of Pastrana in 1998. Our model predicts that ￿ > 0 (a greater share of votes for Uribe would
lead to greater paramilitary presence after 2002), and ￿ < 0|so that the higher was Pastrana’s
vote share in 1998, the less Uribe would bene￿t from the support of the paramilitaries and thus
according to our theoretical model, the more likely are the paramilitaries to be eliminated.
An alternative measure of the paramilitary-induced vote advantage of Uribe, which is more




36which directly captures the vote advantage of Uribe in 2002 relative to Pastrana’s vote in 1998,
if any (in municipality m). With the same reasoning, we expect the coe￿cient on this variable to
be positive|the greater is vu
m;2002 ￿ v
p
m;1998, the more Uribe gained relative to Pastrana and the
more we would expect paramilitaries to persist.
The results from estimating various versions of (10) are shown in Table 9. Throughout this
table and the next where we examine robustness, all of the main e￿ects are evaluated at the sample
means to facilitate interpretation. The ￿rst six columns of Table 9 use the attacks measure non-
state armed actor presence, while the next four use the displaced measure. The ￿nal two use the
￿rst principal component of attacks and displaced.
The results are broadly consistent with our model, in particular, with the predictions of
Proposition 3. In column 1 of Table 9 we estimate the simplest version of (10). Consistent
with these predictions, the estimate of Uribe’s vote share of value to the sample mean, ￿, is
estimated at 0:14 (with a standard error=0.08). This estimate, which is marginally signi￿cant,
suggests that other things equal, the greater the vote share for President Uribe in the 2002
election in municipality m, the greater the paramilitary presence in the municipality after 2002.
Quantitatively this is a sizable, though not implausible, e￿ect implying that a 10% increase in
Uribe’s vote share in an average municipality under paramilitary control will increase paramilitary
presence by 0.014. This is a large e￿ect compared to the mean of paramilitary presence in the
whole sample, which is 0.04, though smaller for the mean when we restrict attention to only those
municipalities which had positive paramilitary presence, this being 0.15.41
Moreover, again consistent with the predictions of Proposition 3, the coe￿cient on the in-
teraction between Uribe’s and Pastrana’s vote shares is negative and statistically signi￿cant at
5%, ^ ￿ = ￿0:63 (standard error=0.33). This implies that, all else equal, paramilitaries were more
likely to persist in areas where President Uribe received a high share of votes, and on the basis
of the votes of President Pastrana in the 1998 election, he would have been expected to receive a
lower vote share. Column 2 adds covariates to the basic model of Column 1 while Column 3 adds
controls for guerilla presence in 2000-2001. In these columns, the interaction term remains nega-
tive and has a similar quantitative magnitudes to that in Column 1, but is no longer statistically
signi￿cant (in several other speci￿cations in this and the next table, the interaction term is again
signi￿cant).
Column 4 reports a regression model more directly inspired by Proposition 3, which makes the




m;1998g. This variable is positive though again marginally insigni￿cant
in column 3 (coe￿cient = 0.25, s.e. = 0.15), consistent with our theoretical predictions.
In Columns 5 and 6, we use the logarithms of all of the variables so we lose a lot of observa-
41Since this is the e￿ect at the sample mean and ￿ < 0, the impact of Uribe’s vote share is signi￿cantly higher
in municipalities with lower Pastrana share.
37tions (all the zeros). In Column 5 with this speci￿cation the direct e￿ect of Uribe’s vote share
is not signi￿cant, but the interaction term is negative and highly signi￿cant (this speci￿cation




m;1998g is again positive and marginally signi￿cant (coe￿cient = 0.56, standard
error = 0.30).
The next four columns examine the same models using the displaced measure of paramilitary
and guerilla presence. In all of these speci￿cations the direct e￿ect of Uribe’s vote share is positive
and highly signi￿cant. The interaction term is also always negative, and statistically signi￿cant




m;1998g, the estimated e￿ect is positive and highly signi￿cant.
The ￿nal two columns use the ￿rst principal components of attacks and displaced. These
results are similar, and in fact more supportive of the predictions of our model. The direct e￿ect
of Uribe’s vote share evaluated at the sample mean is positive and statistically signi￿cant, and the




the results are now much more precisely estimated and the coe￿cient on this table is now highly
signi￿cant.
Table 10 investigates the robustness of the basic results in Table 9. In particular, it uses a
two-year window instead of the three-year window in Table 9 (that is, we de￿ne Pm;t<2002 and
Pm;t>2002 using 1999, 2000 and 2001 (t<2002) or between 2003, 2004, 2005 (t>2002) in either
case divided by the population of the municipality). The results are broadly similar to those in
Table 9. In particular, the interaction term is now more precisely estimated and is statistically
signi￿cant in almost all speci￿cations.
Overall, we interpret the results in this section as providing some support to our Proposition
3 that incumbent politicians in power will tend to refrain from eliminating paramilitaries in areas
where these groups deliver votes and that this e￿ect is stronger where they would not have
otherwise done as well.
7 The Symbiotic Relationship between the Paramilitaries and
the Executive
7.1 Econometric Evidence
The last section provided some evidence on a possible symbiotic relationship between the paramil-
itaries and the executive. In places where the paramilitaries delivered votes in 2002, they were
more likely to survive. To investigate this symbiotic relationship, or the ‘quid pro quo,’ more
extensively, it is useful to study key legislation the executive brought to the legislature, and how
paramilitary presence may have in￿uenced voting on these legislations. We can only examine the
￿rst issue, what laws the executive proposed, using case study evidence. To look at the second
38issue, how paramilitary presence may have in￿uenced voting patterns, we again examine roll-call
votes.
We focus on a very salient and relevant roll-call for which we have data: the vote on whether or
not to change the Constitution to drop the single-period term limit on the President. If Senators
who were elected with support from paramilitaries were more inclined to support this change
in the Constitution, then this would be direct, though naturally not de￿nitive, evidence that
the paramilitaries supported Uribe either as quid pro quo or because he would naturally choose
policies more in line with their interests and preferences.
As in our previous analysis of roll-call votes we use a simple empirical strategy based on
equation (9) in subsections 5.4 and 5.5. We now de￿ne ￿l to be the proportion of Senators on list
l that voted in favor of changing the Constitution to allow President Uribe to run for re-election.
All of the remaining variables are de￿ned as before.
Table 11 looks at the roll-call vote for re-election. The structure of this table is similar to that
of Table 8, except that the two parts of the table now use the attacks and displaced measures. The
￿rst column again estimates a simple regression of ￿l on party dummies. It shows that members
of third parties tended to vote in favor of re-election, as did Conservatives, while members of Left
parties tended to vote against (all relative to Liberals). Columns 2-4 then use the simple model
(9) with the attacks data, while 5-7 estimate the same model using the displaced data. Using
either strategy, and even holding party a￿liation constant, there is a robust positive e￿ect of the
presence of paramilitaries in areas where Senate lists received a high vote share on the propensity
of Senators on the list to vote in favor of changing the Constitution to allow President Uribe to
run again. This e￿ect is statistically signi￿cant in all columns, except in column 7 where we also
include party identity (this suggests that in this instance most of the e￿ects of paramilitaries on
politicians behavior might be working through third party a￿liation). These columns also again
show that there is no robust impact of the presence of guerillas on the voting behavior of Senators
on this measure.
7.2 Case Study Evidence
There is a large case study literature which is consistent with the notion of a quid pro quo between
executive and paramilitary politicians. One obvious arena is the formulation of the Justice and
Peace Law which took place after the secret negotiations at Santa F￿ e de Ralito. This law was
widely criticized both inside and outside Colombia as being far too lenient on paramilitaries.
Here we focus on a very revealing more recent series of events which also seem to speak to
the symbiotic relationship. Even though many Congressmen and Senators have been arrested,
they are replaced in the legislature by their alternates (in Spanish ‘suplentes’) who appear on the
same list at the time of the election. In consequence, their political in￿uence is little diminished.
To change this situation members of Congress proposed a political reform in 2008 to remove
39these politicians and their alternates from the legislature. This initiative was killed when many
politicians failed to appear for a debate so that a quorum was not reached. The fact that Senators
failed to appear for the vote was widely blamed on President Uribe (see the remarks of Senators
Gustavo Petro and Rafael Pardo (\Entierro de quinta" Semana, June 7, 2008),42 and Semana
notes \If Uribismo lost its majorities in Congress, it would be di￿cult to get the approval of key
projects, such as a new reform to that ‘little article’ of the Constitution."43 The ‘little article’
(used sarcastically) in the Constitution is the change to allow President Uribe to run for a third
term of o￿ce. This experience shows how President Uribe relies on the legislative support of
politicians deeply implicated with the paramilitaries to pass key bills.44
After this project failed the executive proposed an alternative political reform in August 2008
which involved changing the Constitution to take away the power of the Supreme Court to try
Congressmen. As Jos￿ e Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at Human Rights Watch put it \Uribe
is brazenly trying to take the power to investigate Congressmen away from the one institution
that has done the most to uncover and break paramilitary in￿uence in the Congress ... This
proposal serves no real purpose, other than to help members of Uribe’s coalition get o￿ the hook"
(Human Rights Watch, 2008).
8 Conclusions
Why are many states in less-developed societies unable to establish Weber’s famous monopoly of
violence in their territories? The standard explanation relies on the inability of the central state to
broadcast its power throughout the territories that it nominally controls and views an extension
of this power to the periphery as a natural by-product of ‘political modernization’. In this paper
we developed an alternative perspective, suggesting that the central state can develop (even
‘modernize’) without establishing such a monopoly of violence because there may be a symbiotic
relationship between the parties controlling the central state and non-state actors exercising power
in the peripheries of the country. The origins of this symbiotic relationship is that non-state armed
actors can provide support to those controlling the central state. This is particularly important
in democracies where non-state armed actors can control elections. Since they naturally have
political preferences, they can (credibly) deliver votes for the national politicians in line with
their ideological and policy biases. Politicians elected with the implicit support of these non-state
actors will then have less incentive to eliminate them, leading to an equilibrium without a full
monopoly of violence of the central state. We developed this idea theoretically and provided
42http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/entierro-quinta/112489.aspx
43In Spanish \Si el uribismo perd￿ ￿a sus mayorias en el Congreso, se le har￿ ￿a di￿cil lograr el visto bueno para
proyectos clave, como una nueva reforma a ese ‘articulito’ de la Constituci￿ on" (Semana, June 7, 2008).
44In September 2009 both houses of the legislature voted to hold a national referendum on whether to allow Uribe
to run for a third term. Socialists and members of the Liberal party abstained in these votes so we do not have
further roll-calls on this issue.
40empirical support using recent political events from Colombia.
Our model makes a series of predictions, which we investigated using Colombian data. Our
empirical evidence began by using a variety of strategies to con￿rm that paramilitaries have
indeed had a signi￿cant impact on elections in Colombia. Following the foundation of the AUC,
there is a sharp increase in the vote share of third parties, which were explicitly or implicitly
associated with paramilitaries, in areas that have high paramilitary presence. The same areas
also showed an increase in electoral concentration (the vote share of the most ‘popular’ list in a
municipality). We also presented evidence that high paramilitary presence in areas where senators
received large proportions of their votes predicts how they voted on key clauses of the Justice and
Peace Law, and whether they get arrested for illicit links with the paramilitaries. We also found
that paramilitary presence is correlated with vote share of the winning presidential candidate,
￿ Alvaro Uribe.
The two key predictions of our theoretical model are that paramilitaries should persist to the
extent that they deliver votes to politicians whose preferences are closer to their own and that this
e￿ect is larger in areas where these politicians would otherwise not do well. These results illustrate
the possible presence of a symbiotic relationship between the executive and the paramilitaries.
We further illustrated this relationship by showing that the proportion of the votes which a senate
list won in paramilitary areas is positively correlated with the proportion of Senators on the list
that voted to change the Constitution to allow President Uribe to run for a second term.
Nevertheless, neither our results nor the case study literature suggests the presence of a formal
‘coalition’ between paramilitary groups and President Uribe. They are consistent, however, with
the idea that Uribe’s policies are closer to those preferred by paramilitaries than those of other
parties which naturally gives the paramilitaries an interest in generating support for him. As
Jairo Angarita former leader of the AUC’s Sin￿ u and San Jorge blocs and Salvatore Mancuso’s
deputy declared in September 2005, he was proud to work for the
\reelection of the best President we have ever had".45
Naturally, di￿erent interpretations of the data are possible. For instance, it is possible that
people in paramilitary areas are naturally pro ‘law and order’ or more ‘conservative’ so that pres-
ence of paramilitaries is endogenous to ‘voter preferences’. If this were true our results connecting
the presence of paramilitaries to Presidential vote share could be due to omitted variable bias.
This might also undermine our interpretation of the roll-call votes since it would imply that Sen-
ators who voted to change the Constitution to allow President Uribe to run again did so because
their voters’ preferred it. These alternative hypotheses do not appear plausible explanations for
the patterns, however. First, our identi￿cation comes from the timing of the formation of the AUC
45El Tiempo, September 7, 2005.
41and their decision to develop an electoral strategy (relying on intimidation, murder and manipu-
lation to get their candidates elected to national o￿ce). For example, prior to these events, there
was no signi￿cant di￿erences between electoral concentration in areas with or without paramili-
taries, indicating that political preferences did not systematically di￿er between these two areas.
The timing of the formation of the AUC stems mostly from the collapse of the Medell￿ ￿n and
Cali drug cartels and is unlikely to re￿ect a change in political preferences on the part of voters.
Second, to the extent that voter preferences di￿er with some areas being more conservative than
others, this would be controlled for by our use of ￿xed e￿ects as long as these di￿erences are
time-invariant. Moreover, the case study literature suggests something of a ‘reality check’ on this
argument since it provides extensive evidence of coercion and manipulation of elections in depart-
ments such as Magdalena, C￿ esar, C￿ orboda and Sucre with high paramilitary presence. Third, the
fact that paramilitary presence predicts arrests of Senators makes it improbable that politicians
are simply representing voter preferences. These results, along with the case study literature,
suggests that politicians formed coalitions with paramilitaries, or paramilitaries generated their
own politicians. Fourth, we tried to explicitly control for the time varying e￿ects of conservative
leanings of certain municipalities.
An important area for future investigation is the impact of non-state armed actors on public
good provision. If the paramilitaries, for example, are e￿ectively the local state, how do they do
at providing public goods or services relative to the legitimate state? The case study evidence
is mixed on this. Some, such as Guti￿ errez San￿ ￿n and Bar￿ on (2005, p. 13) argue in their study
of the development of the paramilitaries in Puerto Boyac￿ a that they undertook \investments in
patronage (drug stores, clinics, health campaigns, educational services)." Duncan’s (2007) also
supports this idea (see also the|probably not entirely credible|claims in Casta~ no, 2001). Yet
other anecdotes mitigate against it in Casanare, for example, and in La Guajira.
A ￿nal and crucial question concerns the external validity of these ￿ndings. Are the mecha-
nisms we discuss only relevant in Colombia, or do they also in￿uence the creation of the monopoly
of violence in other states? Although our arguments in this paper contrast with the emphasis of
much of the existing literature on state formation, there are several other instances where non-
state actors appear to play a similar role to that of paramilitaries in Colombia. For example, as
mentioned in the Introduction, the existence of the tribal areas in Waziristan does not imply that
the state has not formed in Pakistan, but is indicative of a di￿erent equilibrium pattern similar
to that in Colombia. A related example comes from Italy and the role of the Ma￿a in delivering
votes to the Christian Democratic Party (Walston, 1988). Finally, the long autonomy of the US
South after the Hayes-Tilden agreement of 1877 until the Civil Rights and Voting Rights acts of
the 1960s also presents many parallels with the Colombian case. Southern political elites were
able to establish a one-party undemocratic political system based on the disenfranchisement and
coercion of blacks. The power thus consolidated gave them great in￿uence in national political
42institutions where they could both impede legislation they did not like, but where they also sup-
plied votes, which was exactly what the Hayes-Tilden deal was about. A telling piece of evidence
in favor of this interpretation is provided by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s reaction to a proposal to
pass legislation to attempt to restrict lynching. In response he argued that Southern legislators
\are chairmen or occupy strategic places on most of the Senate and House committees ... If I
come out for the anti-lynching bill now, they will block every bill I ask Congress to pass" (quoted
in Frederickson, 2001, p. 20). There is therefore some evidence that the mechanisms we have
identi￿ed here are of quite general applicability.
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48Appendix: The Evidence from Magdalena
In this Appendix, we examine voting patterns in the Department of Magdalena, where various
paramilitary groups have been very active over our period of investigation. In Map 3 we reproduce
the data on electoral concentration, de￿ned as the vote share of the list that won the most votes,
in Magdalena for the 1998, 2002 and 2006 elections for the Senate. We also place on the map
the proportion of votes that Senator Luis Eduardo Vives (14th on Table A1) and Congressman
Alfonso Campo, one of the signatories at Sante F￿ e de Ralito, won in each municipality. The map
shows the dramatic increase in electoral concentration in 2002. In particular, in the dark red areas
speci￿c politicians were winning essentially 100% of the votes cast in a municipality. One sees
that Vives and Campo won very large proportions of votes in the southernmost municipalities
such as San Sebasti￿ an and Guamal. In the dark red municipalities to the north Senators Salom￿ on
Saade and Dieb Maloof won nearly all of the votes (2nd and 5th in Table 1, 3rd and 4th in Table
A1). Vives, Maloof and Saade all represented third parties and Vives and Maloof have been
tried and found guilty of links with paramilitaries, while Saade is currently under investigation.
Concentration falls in 2006 however and Vives wins large proportions of his vote in municipalities
to the north, such as El Pinon and San Antonio, where in 2002 he had won no votes. Campo’s
vote also becomes more evenly distributed over the Department, though he was not re-elected in
2006. The pattern is similar for the other Senators and despite of this fall, Maloof and Vives were
both re-elected, with almost the same number of votes as in 2006. For example Vives got 53,759
in Magdalena in 2002 and 54,609 in 2006.46
In 2006 Jos￿ e Joaqu￿ ￿n Vives, a Congressman for Magdalena prior to 2002 whose vote share
collapsed in the 2002 elections, noted
\Certain Congressmembers have credentials that are built upon the blood of inno-
cent citizens ... In Magdalena circumstances still do not exist for the next election to
be free. It must also be said clearly and directly that democracy has been kidnapped
in the department and remains kidnapped through a relationship created between
certain political groups and the self-defense forces."47
Overall, the data for Magdalena show a signi￿cant increase in electoral concentration in 2002
with several Senators and Congressmen who subsequently were charged with links to paramili-
taries, winning close to 100% of the vote in a few selected municipalities. In 2006 concentration
46Prior to the 2006 congressional elections two pro-Uribe parties dropped ￿ve candidates from their lists who
were accused of having direct links with paramilitaries. The U party dropped Habib Merheg, Dieb Maloof and Luis
Eduardo Vives and Cambio Radical dropped Jorge Caballero and Jorge Castro. Expelled candidates re-appeared
on the lists of smaller pro-Uribe parties and Merheg and Maloof won seats in Congress with the Colombia Viva
Party.
47Quoted in the article ‘Mas all￿ a del control territorial’ El Espectador, January 22, 2006.
49went down, but interestingly Senators Maloof and Vives were re-elected, though now with their











Status                
(4)
% Votes In 
Paramilitary Zones 
(5)
MAURICIO PIMIENTO BARRERA yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 68.30
DIEB NICOLAS MALOOF CUSE yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 56.93
ALVARO ARAUJO CASTRO yes yes Arrested 54.78
JUAN CARLOS MARTINEZ SINISTERRA yes yes Arrested 51.22
SALOMON DE JESUS SAADE ABDALA no yes Investigated 41.40
CARLOS ARTURO CLAVIJO VARGAS yes Arrested 39.33
JUAN GOMEZ MARTINEZ yes yes 34.96
ISABEL CELIS YAÑEZ no 33.96
PIEDAD CORDOBA no no no 33.20
GERMAN HERNANDEZ AGUILERA no yes yes 31.46
FLOR MODESTA GNECCO ARREGOCES yes yes yes 31.27
RUBEN DARIO QUINTERO VILLADA yes Arrested 30.03
BERNARDO ALEJANDRO GUERRA HOYOS no no 29.48
HUGO SERRANO GOMEZ no no 29.21
WILLIAM ALFONSO MONTES MEDINA yes yes yes Arrested (Not Guilty) 28.48
LUIS GUILLERMO VELEZ TRUJILLO no yes yes 28.44
CONSUELO DE MUSTAFA no yes 28.22
JOSE RENAN TRUJILLO GARCIA no yes yes 26.80
VICTOR RENAN BARCO LOPEZ no yes yes Investigated 26.11
GUILLERMO GAVIRIA ZAPATA no no yes Investigated 25.07
Senator
Table 1: Top 20 Senators By Vote Share in Paramilitary Areas
 
Notes: Senators that obtained the twenty highest shares of votes in municipalities with high paramilitary presence. High paramilitary presence is measured by a 
dummy that takes the value of one if the municipality had a total number of attacks by the paramilitaries per 1.000 inhabitants above the 75
th percentile in the 
1997-2001 period. A Yes indicates that the senator belongs to a third party in the election of 2002 (column (1)), voted yes to approve reelection (column (2)) or yes 
to reintroduce Sedition and Reduction of Sentences articles in the Justice and Peace Law (column (3)). The status of the senator (column (4)) is that on May 21 of 
2009 and is taken from Indepaz http://www.indepaz.org.co (for reelected senators) and from the news. A blank space in columns (2) or (3) means that the senator 







(1) Paramilitary Presence   0.12 (0.29) 0.42 (0.45) 0.02 (0.03)
(2) Paramilitary Presence 1996-1997  0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.04) 0.00 (0.01)
(3) Paramilitary Presence 2000-2001 0.04 (0.12) 0.15 (0.20) 0.01 (0.02)
(4) Paramilitary Presence 2004-2005 0.03 (0.13) 0.11 (0.25) 0.00 (0.01)
(5) Guerrilla Presence  1.03 (2.03) 1.82 (2.76) 0.77 (1.63)
(6) Guerrilla Presence 1996-1997 0.13 (0.31) 0.27 (0.48) 0.08 (0.20)
(7) Guerrilla Presence 2000-2001 0.21 (0.43) 0.44 (0.65) 0.14 (0.29)
(8) Guerrilla Presence 2004-2005 0.23 (0.87) 0.33 (0.67) 0.19 (0.92)
(9) Third Parties Vote Share in the Senate Before 2001 14.72 (15.90) 11.22 (13.06) 15.95 (16.61)
(10) Third Parties Vote Share in the Senate After 2002 32.88 (19.65) 38.59 (20.78) 30.90 (18.85)
(11) Third Parties Vote Share in the Congress Before 2001 26.80 (21.75) 22.84 (19.37) 28.17 (22.36)
(12) Third Parties Vote Share in the Congress After 2002 35.42 (21.48) 38.45 (22.12) 34.39 (21.19)
(13) Winning Vote Share in the Senate Before 2001 33.49 (19.77) 31.01 (18.01) 34.34 (20.29)
(14) Winning Vote Share in the Senate After 2001 39.12 (18.97) 44.32 (19.99) 37.35 (18.29)
(15) Winning Vote Share in the Congress Before 2001 29.69 (17.02) 30.37 (17.38) 29.45 (16.89)
(16) Winning Vote Share in the Congress After 2001 35.37 (15.81) 37.51 (16.11) 34.65 (15.66)
(17) Winning Presidential Candidate Vote Share Before 2001 42.29 (22.73) 39.21 (23.29) 43.38 (22.46)
(18) Winning Presidential Candidate Vote share after 2001 52.35 (21.47) 54.58 (21.66) 51.58 (21.37)
(19) Preferences for the Right 42.26 (27.47) 36.73 (28.32) 44.25 (26.91)
(20) Preferences for the Left  5.05 (11.41) 6.12 (11.47) 4.67 (11.37)
(21) Land Gini  in 1985 70.11 (10.58) 69.63 (10.51) 70.28 (10.61)
(22) Unfullfiled Basic Needs in 1993 53.87 (19.56) 55.33 (16.43) 53.36 (20.55)
(23) Average Population in 1993 and 2005 34828.42 (202618.10) 17851.39 (23238.26) 40534.65 (233578.10)
(24) Rural Index in 1993 62.63 (24.50) 60.65 (20.29) 63.33 (25.81)
(25) Distance to the States' Capital 129.66 (105.54) 146.12 (115.71) 123.85 (101.16)
(26) Altitude 1157.38 (897.89) 983.56 (785.11) 1218.72 (927.16)
(27) Precipitation 1912.28 (1061.04) 2235.12 (1146.02) 1798.36 (1005.68)
(28) Dummy of Opium Cultivation in 1994 0.10 (0.29) 0.05 (0.23) 0.11 (0.31)
(29) Dummy of Coca Cultivation in 1994 0.05 (0.23) 0.04 (0.20) 0.06 (0.24)
Whole Sample  High Paramilitary Presence  Low Paramilitary Presence
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
 
Notes: Each variable in rows (1) to (8) is the sum of paramilitary or guerrilla attacks per 1.000 inhabitants over the corresponding time period averaged over 
different samples of municipalities. Whole sample columns report means and standard deviations of variables in the entire sample, High Paramilitary 
Presence columns restrict the sample to municipalities where the 1997-2005 attacks by the paramilitaries dummy takes the value of one (see footnote of table 
3 for definition of this variable), Low Paramilitary Presence columns restrict the sample to municipalities where the 1997-2005 attacks by the paramilitaries 
dummy takes the value of 0.  Dependent Variable is Vote 
Share obtained by Third 


















Paramilitary Presence -11.35 -10.79
(2.67) (2.75)
Paramilitary Presence X 1994 4.95 0.79 0.57 4.15 1.91 1.33
(1.54) (1.47) (1.61) (1.25) (1.24) (1.31)
Paramilitary Presence X 1998 4.22 0.34 0.41 2.86 0.12 0.29
(1.99) (2.09) (2.20) (1.68) (1.73) (1.86)
Paramilitary Presence X 2002 20.97 15.88 15.80 13.71 10.62 10.47 17.81 17.02
(3.14) (3.18) (3.23) (1.98) (1.94) (2.01) (2.87) (3.01)
Paramilitary Presence X 2006 22.10 10.79 10.29 14.54 8.48 8.31 18.02 17.21
(3.19) (3.03) (3.04) (1.99) (1.66) (1.73) (3.01) (3.15)
Guerrilla Presence -1.06
(1.78)
Guerrilla presence X 1994 0.20 2.49
(0.56) (1.54)
Guerrilla Presence X 1998 -0.06 -0.72
(0.66) (1.89)
Guerrilla Presence X 2002 0.07 0.66 2.00
(0.70) (1.99) (2.16)
Guerrilla Presence X 2006 0.45 0.70 2.79
(0.61) (1.80) (2.32)
Controls Interacted with Year No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
Dummies
Observations 5379 4915 4915 5379 4915 4915 3286 3286
Table 3: Paramilitary Presence and Third Parties Share of Votes in the Elections for the  Senate
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Attacks Attacks Dummy Time Varying Attacks Dummy
 
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel regressions with full set of municipality and year dummies.  Dependent variable is share of votes of 
third parties lists (not Conservative, nor Liberal, nor from the left) in the elections for the Senate. We report results with three different measures of paramilitary presence: i. The sum of 
paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m during the 1997-2005 period in columns (1), (2) and (3); ii. A time invariant dummy that takes the value of one if the sum of 
paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m during the 1997-2005 period is above the 75
th percentile in columns (4), (5) and (6); iii. A time varying attacks dummy that 
takes the value of one in municipality m and time t if time varying measure of attacks over population is above the  75
th percentile (calculated over all municipalities and years) in 
columns (7) and (8). When guerrilla presence is included, in columns (3), (6) and (8), it is measured as the corresponding paramilitary presence measure. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) 
include the following controls interacted with time dummies: altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land 
gini in 1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium cultivation in 1994, preferences for the Right in 1986 and preferences for the Left in 
1986.   
  
Dependent Variable is Vote Share 
obtained by Third Parties in The 

















Paramilitary Presence -3.12 -2.41
(3.98) (4.06)
Paramilitary Presence X 1994 2.53 0.16 0.06 2.24 1.27 0.86
(2.29) (2.33) (2.35) (1.99) (2.10) (2.17)
Paramilitary Presence X 1998 -0.56 -1.49 -1.52 -1.74 -2.82 -3.63
(2.36) (2.31) (2.39) (2.12) (2.11) (2.20)
Paramilitary Presence X 2002 13.63 9.55 8.81 7.67 5.78 3.94 9.15 7.84
(4.05) (4.07) (4.06) (2.92) (3.02) (3.16) (4.26) (4.39)
Paramilitary Presence X 2006 15.18 6.23 6.24 7.55 2.98 2.55 7.97 7.08
(2.31) (2.08) (2.20) (2.24) (2.09) (2.17) (4.53) (4.63)
Guerrilla Presence -1.23
(1.93)
Guerrilla Presence X 1994 0.08 1.68
(0.74) (2.27)
Guerrilla Presence X 1998 0.03 3.49
(0.79) (2.41)
Guerrilla Presence X 2002 0.62 7.86 3.80
(1.08) (3.29) (2.27)
Guerrilla Presence X 2006 -0.01 1.85 2.74
(0.69) (2.38) (2.85)
Controls Interacted with Year No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
Dummies
Observations 5363 4899 4899 5363 4899 4899 3289 3289
Table 4: Paramilitary Presence and Third Parties Share of Votes in The Elections for the Congress
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Attacks Attacks Dummy Time Varying Attacks Dummy
 
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel regressions with full set of municipality and year dummies. Dependent variable is share of votes of 
third parties lists (not Conservative, nor Liberal, nor from the left) in the elections for the Congress. We report results with three different measures of paramilitary presence: i. The sum 
of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m during the 1997-2005 period in columns (1), (2) and (3); ii. A time invariant dummy that takes the value of one if the sum 
of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m during the 1997-2005 period is above the 75
th percentile in columns (4), (5) and (6); iii. A time varying attacks dummy that 
takes the value of one in municipality m and time t if time varying measure of attacks over population is above the 75
th percentile (calculated over all municipalities and years) in columns 
(7) and (8). When guerrilla presence is included, in columns (3), (6) and (8), it is measured as the corresponding paramilitary presence measure. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) include the 
following controls interacted with time dummies:  altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini in 
1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium cultivation in 1994, preferences for the Right in 1986 and preferences for the Left in 1986.  
 Dependent Variable is Vote Share 
obtained by Third Parties in The 





























Paramilitary Presence 3.08 -5.17
(3.76) (6.51)
Paramilitary Presence X 1994 0.13 4.64 1.17 1.81
(0.03) (1.50) (0.61) (1.57)
Paramilitary Presence X 1998 0.10 5.22 1.05 4.57
(0.04) (2.07) (0.74) (2.23)
Paramilitary Presence X 2002 0.32 11.74 3.80 5.68 14.59 15.35
(0.05) (2.52) (4.38) (0.96) (2.60) (6.84)
Paramilitary Presence X 2006 0.16 10.25 3.41 3.20 10.20 13.78
(0.06) (2.09) (4.02) (0.89) (2.27) (6.79)
Guerrilla Presence -14.80 -10.60
(3.59) (4.50)
Guerrilla Presence X 1994 -0.00 1.45 0.53 2.88
(0.02) (1.70) (0.92) (1.88)
Guerrilla Presence X 1998 -0.00 -1.91 0.13 -1.00
(0.02) (2.32) (1.15) (2.42)
Guerrilla Presence X 2002 -0.08 -1.13 13.09 -1.80 -1.69 9.52
(0.03) (2.59) (4.15) (1.21) (2.56) (4.93)
Guerrilla Presence X 2006 -0.02 -2.41 15.94 -0.01 -0.49 13.08
(0.03) (2.27) (3.79) (1.06) (2.31) (4.74)
Observations 4915 4915 3286 4915 4915 3286
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Table 5: Paramilitary Presence and Third Parties Share of Votes in the Electionf for the Senate. Robustness to Alternative Definitions of 
Paramilitary Presence.
 
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel regressions with full set of municipality and year dummies.  
Dependent variable is share of votes of third parties lists (not Conservative, nor Liberal nor from the left) in the elections for the Senate. We report 
results with six different measures of paramilitary presence: i. The sum of people displaced by the paramilitary per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality 
m during the 1997-2007 period in columns (1); ii. A time invariant dummy that takes the value of one if the sum of people displaced by the 
paramilitary per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m during the 1997-2005 period is above the 75% percentile in column (2); iii. A time varying 
displaced dummy that takes the value of one in municipality m and time t if a time varying measure of attacks over population is above the  75
th 
percentile (calculated over all municipalities and years) in column (3); iv. The principal component of attacks and displaced in column (4); v. A 
time invariant attacks and displaced dummy that takes the values of one if both attacks and displaced time invariant dummies take the value of 1 in 
column (5); vi. A time varying attacks and displaced dummy that takes the values of one if both attacks and displaced time varying dummies take 
the value of 1 in column (6). Guerrilla presence is measured accordingly. All specifications include the following controls interacted with time 
dummies:  altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini in 1985, 
unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium cultivation in 1994, preferences for the Right in 1986 and 




































Paramilitary Presence 4.13 4.41 -0.90 -0.89
(1.94) (2.00) (2.72) (2.72)
Paramilitary Presence X 1994 0.81 0.23 0.44 -0.08 2.81 2.02 1.19 0.59
(1.63) (1.67) (1.18) (1.20) (1.32) (1.34) (0.96) (0.98)
Paramilitary Presence X 1998 2.86 2.47 0.78 0.29 0.64 0.29 0.68 0.72
(1.80) (1.81) (1.29) (1.33) (1.54) (1.53) (1.12) (1.16)
Paramilitary Presence X 2002 8.87 9.26 4.52 4.78 -0.39 -0.63 4.07 4.32 3.53 3.89 3.01 3.19
(1.81) (1.88) (1.54) (1.59) (2.14) (2.24) (1.79) (1.88) (1.43) (1.49) (2.95) (2.98)
Paramilitary Presence X 2006 4.47 4.10 1.40 0.95 -5.56 -5.84 -0.63 -1.01 0.62 -0.08 -1.74 -1.62
(1.93) (2.00) (1.31) (1.37) (2.12) (2.20) (1.91) (1.88) (1.24) (1.28) (2.94) (2.97)
Guerrilla Presence -1.83 -1.52
(1.07) (1.12)
Guerrilla Presence X 1994 0.51 2.23 0.71 2.68
(0.28) (1.13) (0.38) (1.08)
Guerrilla Presence X 1998 0.34 2.08 0.30 -0.16
(0.32) (1.34) (0.26) (1.22)
Guerrilla Presence X 2002 -0.31 -1.08 0.76 -0.20 -1.50 -0.31
(0.37) (1.51) (1.32) (0.41) (1.42) (1.31)
Guerrilla Presence X 2006 0.33 1.91 0.63 0.34 3.00 -0.84
(0.41) (1.39) (1.33) (0.32) (1.33) (1.43)
Observations 4915 4915 4915 4915 3286 3286 4899 4899 4899 4899 3289 3289
Attacks Dummy
Time Varying Attacks 
Dummy Attacks Attacks Dummy
Time Varying Attacks 
Dummy
Table 6: Paramilitary Presence and Electoral Concentration in Legislative Elections
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Dependent Variable is Winning Vote Share in the Senate Dependent Variable is Winning Vote Share in the Congress
Attacks
 
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel regressions with full set of municipality and time dummies. Dependent variable is 
total share of votes going to the most popular list in the elections for the Senate/Congress, in municipality m. We report results with three different measures of paramilitary 
presence: i. The sum of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m during the 1997-2005 period in columns (1), (2), (7) and (8); ii. A time invariant dummy 
that takes the value of one if the sum of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m during the 1997-2005 period is above the 75
th percentile in columns (3), 
(4), (9) and (10); iii. A time varying attacks dummy that takes the value of one in municipality m and time t if time varying measure of attacks over population is above the  
75
th percentile (calculated over all municipalities and years) in columns (5), (6), (11) and (12). When guerrilla presence is included it is measured as the corresponding 
paramilitary presence measure. All specifications include the following controls interacted with time dummies:  altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average 
population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini in 1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium 
cultivation in 1994, preferences for the Right in 1986 and preferences for the Left in 1986. 
  
Dependent Variable is  Winning 


















Paramilitary Presence -6.92 -6.91
(3.59) (3.65)
Paramilitary Presence X 2002 10.16 5.31 7.43 3.11 1.26 2.14 8.87 10.49
(1.99) (1.53) (1.59) (1.45) (1.11) (1.13) (3.58) (3.65)
Paramilitary Presence X 2006 21.60 13.67 12.32 11.45 8.17 6.66 12.53 12.23
(2.41) (1.71) (1.64) (1.67) (1.21) (1.20) (3.77) (3.86)
Guerrilla Presence -3.54
(1.61)
Guerrilla Presence X 2002 -1.73 -3.71 -5.53
(0.34) (1.14) (1.73)
Guerrilla Presence X 2006 1.22 6.47 1.70
(0.41) (1.45) (2.21)
Controls Interacted with Year No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
Dummies
Observations 3297 2951 2951 3297 2951 2951 3297 3297
Tables 7: Paramilitary Presence and Winning Presidential Candidate Share of Votes
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Attacks Attacks Dummy Time Varying Attacks Dummy
 
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel regressions with full set of municipality and year dummies. Dependent variable is share of votes 
of the winning presidential candidate. We report results with three different measures of paramilitary presence: i. The sum of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m 
during the 1997-2005 period in columns (1), (2) and (3); ii. A time invariant dummy that takes the value of one if the sum of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m 
during the 1997-2005 period is above the 75
th percentile in columns (4), (5) and (6); iii. A time varying attacks dummy that takes the value of one in municipality m and time t if time 
varying measure of attacks over population is above the  75
th percentile (calculated over all municipalities and years) in columns (7) and (8). When guerrilla presence is included, in 
columns (3), (6) and (8), it is measured as the corresponding paramilitary presence measure. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) include the following controls interacted with time dummies:  
altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini in 1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca 





Section    
(1)
Cross 
Section    
(2)
Cross 
Section    
(3)
Cross 
Section    
(4)
Cross 
Section    
(5)
Cross 
Section    
(6)
Cross 
Section    
(7)
Cross 
Section    
(8)
Cross 
Section    
(9)
Cross 
Section    
(10)
Cross 
Section    
(11)
Cross 
Section    
(12)
Dummy Conservative 0.05 0.12 -0.01 0.09 0.41 0.38
(0.12) (0.14) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14)
Dummy Left -0.10 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.59 -0.54
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.14)
Dummy Third Parties 0.19 0.21 0.06 0.08 0.34 0.33
(0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.13)
Share of Votes From:
Paramilitary Areas 1.38 1.03 0.92 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.83 1.33 0.93
(0.42) (0.51) (0.45) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.41) (0.53) (0.54)
Guerrilla Areas -0.59 -0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.86 -1.63 -1.26
(0.72) (0.81) (0.75) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.73) (0.89) (0.83)
Right Oriented Areas -0.41 -0.55 -0.31 -0.44 1.37 0.52
(0.42) (0.39) (0.12) (0.21) (0.46) (0.47)
Left Oriented Areas -0.27 -0.29 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.05
(0.18) (0.18) (0.06) (0.06) (0.27) (0.23)
Observations 96 96 96 96 162 162 162 162 57 57 57 57
R-squared 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.41 0.04 0.13 0.45
Senate Congress
Table 8: Senators and Congressmen Arrested, Justice and Peace Law and Votes from High Paramilitary Presence Areas Table 8: Senators and Congressmen Arrested, Justice and Peace Law and Votes from High Paramilitary Presence Areas
Dependent Variable is the Fraction of Arrested Senators/Congressmen in list l.
Dependent Variable is the Fraction of 
Senators  in List l that Voted Yes for 
Reintroducing the Articles of Sedition and 




Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Left hand panel: OLS regressions relating arrests of senators/congressmen to votes obtained in areas with presence of non-state armed 
actors. Dependent variable is the proportion of senators on list l arrested for being involved with the paramilitary. Right hand panel: OLS regressions linking votes in the senate to votes 
obtained in areas with presence of non-state armed actors. Dependent variable is the proportion of senators on list l that voted yes. The vote is for reintroducing the articles of Sedition 
and Reduction of Sentences in the Justice and Peace Law (since only three lists have more than one candidate in the senate in the legislature of 2002-2006 and since candidates in the 
same list voted in the same manner,  the dependent variable is a dummy). Both Panels: To measure the share of votes of list l from a given area we first create dummies for places with 
high presence of paramilitary and guerrilla, Right oriented preferences or Left oriented preferences (municipality m is a high presence area if the value of the corresponding variable in 
municipality m is above the 75
th percentile; paramilitary and guerrilla presence measures are the sum of attacks per 1,000 inhabitant in the 1997-2001 period, just before the elections of 
2002). Then, with each of these dummies, we compute the share of votes in national elections obtained by list l in areas where the dummy takes the value of one.   Dependent Variable is Paramilitary 
Presence in 2004-2005
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(12)
Max{0, Uribe-Pastrana vote share} 0.25 0.56 10.16 0.39 2.57
(0.15) (0.30) (2.95) (0.13) (0.83)
Uribe Vote Share 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.11 4.09 0.32 1.17
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.27) (1.98) (0.10) (0.49)
Patrana Vote Share -0.22 -0.09 -0.09 0.07 -0.85 0.31 -1.30
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.41) (2.81) (0.17) (0.66)
Uribe Vote Share X Pastrana Vote Share -0.63 -0.41 -0.42 -0.46 -12.68 -0.10 -3.65
(0.33) (0.33) (0.36) (0.22) (5.60) (0.09) (1.46)
Paramilitary Presence Before 2002 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.35 0.34 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.21 0.37 0.35
(0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15) (0.14)
Guerrilla Presence Before 2002 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.21 -0.08 -0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 299 291 291 291 88 88 616 616 503 503 643 643
R-squared 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.64 0.61 0.19 0.20 0.43 0.41 0.21 0.22
Table 9: Persistence of Paramilitaries and Vote Share for Alvaro Uribe 





Sample is Restricted to Municiaplities with Paramilitary Presence in 2000-2001
Displaced Log Attacks Log Displaced
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cross Section regressions restricting the sample to municipalities with paramilitary presence in 2000-2001. Dependent variable is 
paramilitary presence in 2004-2005. We report results with  three measures of paramilitary presence: i. Attacks by the paramilitaries in columns (1) to (6) is the sum of paramilitary 
attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m during the 2004-2005 period (dependent variable) and during the 2000-2001 period (paramilitary presence before 2002 variable); ii. 
Displaced by the paramilitaries in columns (7) to (10) is the sum of people displaced by the paramilitary per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m during the 2004-2005  period  (dependent 
variable) and during the 2000-2001 period (paramilitary presence before 2002 variable); iii. The principal component of attacks by the paramilitary and displaced by the paramilitary in 
columns (11) and (12). Guerrilla presence before 2002 is measured as paramilitary presence before 2002. In columns (5), (6), (9) and (10) all variables are in logs. Uribe and Pastrana 
vote shares are the vote shares of Álvaro Uribe in 2002 and Andrés Pastrana in 1998 (first round), respectively. These two variables are measured in a scale from zero to one for ease of 
exposition (to report fewer decimals) and they are also demeaned to interpret the derivatives at the mean of the interactions in all columns except in columns (4), (8) and (12). In these 
columns, the variable of interest is the maximum between zero and the difference between Álvaro Uribe’s vote share in 2002 and Andrés Pastrana’s vote share in 1998 in municipality m. 
All specifications include the same controls as in Table 3: altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini 
in 1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium cultivation in 1994 , preferences for the Right in 1986 and preferences for the Left in 
1986.   Dependent Variable is Paramilitary 
Presence in 2003-2005
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Cross-
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Cross-
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Cross-
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Cross-
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(12)
Max{0, Uribe-Pastrana vote share} 0.27 0.44 9.95 0.25 1.85
(0.16) (0.31) (3.26) (0.13) (0.69)
Uribe Vote Share 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.03 2.58 0.15 0.66
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.22) (2.46) (0.09) (0.43)
Patrana Vote Share -0.23 -0.07 -0.08 0.12 -0.36 0.29 -0.93
(0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.39) (3.87) (0.14) (0.60)
Uribe Vote Share X Pastrana Vote Share -0.77 -0.62 -0.63 -0.46 -19.11 -0.20 -3.84
(0.36) (0.39) (0.41) (0.19) (7.36) (0.07) (1.31)
Paramilitary Presence Before 2002 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.31 0.29 0.12 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.36 0.35
(0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.12)
Guerrilla Presence Before 2002 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.26 0.26 -0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 319 309 309 309 134 134 622 622 524 524 654 654
R-squared 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.55 0.52 0.25 0.26 0.49 0.46 0.25 0.25
Table 10: Persistence of Paramilitaries and Vote Share for Alvaro Uribe . Robustness Checks.
Sample is Restricted to Municiaplities with Paramilitary Presence in 1999-2001
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:





Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cross Section regressions restricting the sample to municipalities with paramilitary presence in 1999-2001. Dependent variable is 
paramilitary presence in 2003-2005. We report results with  three measures of paramilitary presence: i. Attacks by the paramilitaries in columns (1) to (6) is the sum of paramilitary 
attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m during the 2003-2005 period (dependent variable) and during the 1999-2001 period (paramilitary presence before 2002 variable), ii. 
Displaced by the paramilitaries in columns (7) to (10) is the sum of people displaced by the paramilitary per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m during the 2003-2005  period  (dependent 
variable) and during the 1999-2001 period (paramilitary presence before 2002 variable), iii. The principal component of attacks by the paramilitary and displaced by the paramilitary in 
column (11) and (12). Guerrilla presence before 2002 is measured as paramilitary presence before 2002.  In columns (5), (6), (9) and (10) all variables are in logs. Uribe and Pastrana vote 
shares are the vote shares of Álvaro Uribe in 2002 and Andrés Pastrana in 1998 (first round), respectively. These two variables are measured in a scale from zero to one for ease of 
exposition (to report fewer decimals) and they are also demeaned to interpret the derivatives at the mean of the interactions in all columns except in columns (4), (8) and (12). In these 
columns, the variable of interest is the maximum between zero and the difference between Álvaro Uribe’s vote share in 2002 and Andrés Pastrana’s vote share in 1998 in municipality m. 
All specifications include the same controls as in Table 3: altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini 
in 1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium cultivation in 1994, preferences for the Right in 1986 and preferences for the Left in 
1986.   
 Dependent Variable is  the Fraction 
of Senators in List l that Voted Yes 
for Changing the Constitution to 
Allow the  Reelection of the President 
Cross 
Section    
(1)
Cross 
Section    
(2)
Cross 
Section    
(3)
Cross 
Section    
(4)
Cross 
Section    
(5)
Cross 
Section    
(6)
Cross 
Section    
(7)
Dummy Conservative 0.48 0.36 0.33
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Dummy Left -0.52 -0.48 -0.50
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Dummy Third Parties 0.31 0.30 0.28
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Share of Votes From:
Paramilitary Areas 1.26 1.79 1.61 1.02 1.28 0.63
(0.41) (0.55) (0.60) (0.41) (0.44) (0.36)
Guerrilla Areas -0.92 -1.87 -1.39 -0.88 -1.05 -0.21
(0.73) (0.82) (0.80) (0.79) 0.78 (0.65)
Right Oriented Areas 1.81 1.11 1.55 0.88
(0.36) (0.34) (0.34) (0.32)
Left Oriented Areas -0.17 -0.02 -0.27 -0.16
(0.24) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21)
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
R-squared 0.38 0.07 0.21 0.45 0.04 0.17 0.39
Attacks
Table 11 : Reelection and Senators Elected from High Paramilitary Presence Areas
Armed Presence Measured By:
Displaced
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions linking votes in the Senate to votes obtained in areas with presence of 
non-state armed actors. Dependent variable is the proportion of senators in list l that voted yes (since only three lists have more than one 
candidate in the senate in the legislature of 2002-2006 and since candidates in the same list voted in the same manner, the dependent 
variable is a dummy). The vote is for changing the constitution to allow the president to be elected for a second consecutive term. To 
measure the share of votes of list l from a given area we first create dummies for places with high presence of paramilitary, guerrilla, 
right-oriented preferences or left-oriented preferences (municipality m is a high presence area if the value of the corresponding variable 
in municipality m is above the 75
th percentile; paramilitary and guerrilla presence measures are the sum of attacks per 1,000 inhabitant in 
the 1997-2001 period, just before the elections of 2002). Then, with each of these dummies, we compute the share of votes in national 
elections obtained by list l in areas where the dummy takes the value of one. Columns (2) to (4) use attacks to define the presence 
dummies, columns (5) to (7) use displaced.  
 Third Parties 
(1)





Status                
(4)
% Votes In 
Paramilitary Zones 
(5)
FLOR MODESTA GNECCO ARREGOCES yes yes yes 65.67
JAIRO ENRIQUE MERLANO FERNANDEZ yes yes yes Arrested (Not Guilty) 65.37
SALOMON DE JESUS SAADE ABDALA no yes Investigated 65.23
DIEB NICOLAS MALOOF CUSE yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 61.17
MAURICIO PIMIENTO BARRERA yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 59.71
ALVARO ALFONSO GARCIA ROMERO yes Arrested (Guilty) 52.46
CARLOS ARTURO CLAVIJO VARGAS yes Arrested 50.94
JUAN CARLOS MARTINEZ SINISTERRA yes yes Arrested 42.02
JESUS LEON PUELLO CHAMIE no yes 38.94
WILLIAM ALFONSO MONTES MEDINA yes yes yes Arrested (Not Guilty) 34.22
ALVARO ARAUJO CASTRO yes yes Arrested 32.74
PIEDAD DEL SOCORRO ZUCCARDI DE GARCIA no yes yes 31.72
VICENTE BLEL SAAD yes yes yes Arrested 29.51
LUIS EDUARDO VIVES LACOUTURE yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 27.86
PIEDAD CORDOBA no no no 27.63
GABRIEL ACOSTA BENDEK yes 26.05
HUGO SERRANO GOMEZ no no 25.09
MIGUEL ALFONSO DE LA ESPRIELLA BURG yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 23.96
LUIS ALBERTO GIL CASTILLO yes yes Arrested 23.78
RUBEN DARIO QUINTERO VILLADA yes Arrested 23.33
Table A1: Top 20 Senators By Vote Share in Paramilitary Areas Using Displaced 
Senator
 
Notes: Senators that obtained the twenty highest shares of votes in municipalities with high paramilitary presence. High paramilitary presence is measured by a 
dummy that takes the value of one if the municipality had a total number of displaced by the paramilitaries per 1,000 inhabitants is above the 75
th percentile in 
the 1997-2001 period. A Yes indicates that the senator belongs to a third party in the election of 2002 (column (1)), voted yes to approve reelection (column (2)) 
or yes to reintroduce Sedition and Reduction of Sentences articles in the Justice and Peace Law (column (3)). The status of the senator (column (4)) is that on 
May 21 of 2009 and is taken from Indepaz http://www.indepaz.org.co (for reelected senators) and from the news. A blank space in columns (2) or (3) means that 


















































































































Sta Marta (8.2, 24.2)
Aracataca (6.5, 11.3)
Ariguani (22, 5.1)












P. Viejo (16.5, 5)
Remolino (13.2, 7.9)
Salamina (3.9, 15.2)
S. Sebastian (9.1, 2.2
S. Zenon (38.4, 5.5)
Santa Ana (21.4, 11.4)
Sitio Nuevo (7.3, 6.4)
Tenerife (20.8, 2.7)




























































to the Vote Share of Winning Candidate in Municipality  m
Winning Vote Share of L. Vives (Senate) and A. Campo (Congress)
Map 3: Legislative Elections in Magdalena
 